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ABSTRACT
This dissertation builds on the logic of opportunity and the institutional perspective to 
explore how firms iterate to innovate in the uneven landscape of the global digital 
marketplace. In such nascent industries, innovative firms could not rely on differential 
positioning or valuable resources to sustain advantage but must take actions of iterative 
search to capture fleeting opportunities. Specifically, I focus on the role of design 
iteration, through which firms engage in trial-and-error learning and create situation-
specific knowledge. While this logic of opportunity has received a significant upsurge of 
interest from strategy and entrepreneurship scholars, it largely assumes a homogeneous 
institutional environment in which nascent industries are embedded. The assumption 
mostly holds because new industries emerge in advanced economies with similar 
institutions. However, as innovation becomes increasingly democratized on a global scale, 
firms operating in heterogeneous institutional contexts can simultaneously partake in 
nascent industries. It is therefore important for us to understand how firms should 
strategize design iteration to pursue distinctive flows of opportunities in/across various 
institutional contexts. Specifically, I develop three essays around this important inquiry in 
the context of the global mobile application industry. First, while extant research advises 
firms to continually iterate designs, I unveil the hidden dark side of design iteration using 
a difference-in-differences design based on mobile game apps that multihome on two 
platforms. In my second essay, I investigate how firms navigate varying levels of 
institutional uncertainty by strategizing their design iteration. I find that frequent design 
vii 
iterations enable firms to overcome high institutional uncertainty and capture 
opportunities to innovate new products. This study extends the logic of opportunity and a 
dynamic view of institutions. Third, I further explore how digital startups strategize 
iteration with rhythms to compete simultaneously across different institutional contexts. I 
find that while digital startups tend to iterate product designs with rhythms, they 
strategize such iteration rhythms differently to align with their international 
diversification conditions. My dissertation takes an initial but important step toward 
infusing opportunity logic with the institutional perspective and develops a rigorous, 
quantifiable, and generalizable understanding of how firms iterate to innovate in the 
global digital marketplace.  
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This dissertation explores how firms iterate to innovate in the uneven landscape of the 
global digital marketplace. Understanding how firms innovate in nascent industries such 
as the digital marketplace is theoretically intriguing, because it pushes beyond the 
boundary of the traditional strategic logics (e.g., position, leverage) to the less-understood 
opportunity logic (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2008; Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017). In 
nascent industries, where business landscapes are characterized by turbulent changes, 
abundant flows of short-lived, unpredictable opportunities emerge. In such settings, 
innovative firms could not rely on differential positioning or valuable resources to sustain 
advantage but must take actions of iterative search to capture fleeting opportunities (Ott, 
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2017). Particularly, an important form of such iterative search is 
design iteration (e.g., mobile app updates), through which firms test and tune product 
designs based on market feedback (Chen, Wang, Cui, & Li, 2020; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 
1995). By iterating product designs, firms can rapidly create situation-specific new 
knowledge and better sense and seize the newly emerged opportunities for innovation 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Therefore, I seek to develop and examine the understudied 
strategic logic of opportunity by focusing on how firms iterate to innovate digital 
products. 
While the opportunity logic has received a significant upsurge of interest from 
strategy and entrepreneurship scholars, it largely assumes a homogeneous institutional 
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environment in which nascent industries are embedded. Traditionally, most industries 
emerged from advanced economies with similar institutional underpinnings, as suggested 
by the product lifecycle theory (Vernon, 1979). However, as innovation becomes 
increasingly democratized on a global scale (Nambisan, Siegel, & Kenney, 2018), firms 
operating in heterogeneous institutional contexts can simultaneously partake in the 
development of nascent industries (Chakravorti, Tunnard, & Chaturvedi, 2015). Such 
institutional variation could play an important role in explaining firm innovation in 
nascent industries (Paik, Kang, & Seamans, 2019). As institutional scholars have drawn 
on diverse strands of theories to study the role of such institutional differences (e.g., 
Kostova et al., 2020; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008), there is increasing appreciation that 
heterogeneous institutional underpinnings give rise to an uneven opportunity landscape, 
where flows of opportunities are shaped distinctively across countries (Banalieva, 
Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2015; Young, Welter, & Conger, 2018). Ignoring such cross-
country variation in the theoretical background of the opportunity logic would prevent us 
from understanding how firms should strategize design iteration to pursue distinctive 
flows of opportunities across different countries. Thus, my focus on the uneven landscape 
of the global digital marketplace presents an appealing opportunity to infuse the strategic 
logic of opportunity with the institutional perspective. 
Exploring how firms iterate to innovate in the global digital marketplace is also 
practically relevant. Digital innovation has become the primary motor for economic 
growth across various regions, contributing 4.5-15.5% of world GDP (UNCTAD, 2019). 
Notably, digital innovation is not the privilege of firms from several developed countries 
but has spawned into a truly global phenomenon (BCG, 2018). Given its importance, 
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practitioners pioneer in creating insights about how firms should manage digital 
innovation (e.g., agile software development, Scrum), drawing significant attention to 
design iteration activities (e.g., version updates, A/B tests, gray release). It is estimated 
that nowadays over 70% of firms engage in design iteration (Langley, 2017) and devote 
50-90% of their total expenses to iteration-related activities (Li et al., 2017). Hence, this 
dissertation also aims to provide timely and customized insights for managers, 
entrepreneurs, and policy makers regarding how to manage design iteration and foster 
digital innovation in different countries. 
To realize the proposed contributions, I infuse opportunity logic with the 
institutional perspective to inquire how firms strategize design iteration to navigate the 
uneven landscape of the global digital marketplace. Specifically, I develop three research 
questions around this important inquiry and address each one with an essay. First, what is 
the hidden cost of design iteration in the global digital marketplace? If design iteration is 
truly low-cost, there would be little reason to strategize it in the first place. This is 
because firms can iterate product designs any time they want or keep iterating all the time, 
creating little between-firm differences. In my first essay, I scrutinize the demand-side 
costs of design iteration, which provides an important basis for firms to strategize design 
iteration. Second, how should firms strategize design iteration to innovate under varying 
levels of institutional uncertainty? In the second essay, I start by investigating how 
varying levels of institutional uncertainty across countries may shape the opportunity 
landscape for innovation. More importantly, I examine whether iterating extant product 
designs facilitates the introduction of new digital products facing high institutional 
uncertainty. I argue that innovation under uncertainty relies much less on existing 
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knowledge and much more on rapidly creating situation-specific new knowledge through 
design iteration. Third, how do firms strategize design iteration when competing 
simultaneously in multiple markets? Since many digital firms have internationalized 
across multiple country markets, it is important to figure out how firms strategize design 
iteration to deal with the heterogeneous opportunity landscapes simultaneously. 
Increasing evidence from digital practitioners suggests that firms tend to arrange design 
iteration with consistent time intervals. In my third essay, I conceptualize this behavioral 
pattern as design iteration rhythms and explore how firms configure such rhythms to 
better align with their international/platform diversification strategy. These three 
questions are logically linked to each other, and together depict a portrait of how firms 
should strategize design iteration to pursue innovation opportunities in/across different 
countries in the digital marketplace. 
This dissertation is grounded in the global mobile application industry to address 
these important research questions with three empirical essays. Nowadays, firms all over 
the world can develop and release mobile apps through access to global digital platforms 
such as the iOS system and Apple App Store. SensorTower (2020) finds that global 
revenue of mobile apps from iOS and Google play has exceeded $83 billion in 2019, with 
an unprecedented growth rate of 17%. Moreover, this nascent industry is characterized by 
a fast-changing, uncertain institutional environment, where regulations and norms 
regarding the use of mobile apps frequently shift unexpectedly (European Commission, 
2014). It has been widely recognized that mobile app publishers competing in this 
nascent industry pay tremendous attention to design iteration (e.g., app updates), which 
revamps extant product designs and collects up-to-date market feedback (Miric & 
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Jeppesen, 2020; Yoo, Boland, Lyytinen, & Majchrzak, 2012). Drawing upon various data 
sources at app, firm and country levels, I compiled a massive dataset on the global mobile 
application industry. The resulting dataset covers 1.5 million mobile apps, 7,600 app 
publishers, and 58 countries and provides me with critical variables related to app updates, 
new app releases, apps’ daily active users, firms’ international diversification, and 
country-specific digital-related institutional development. Utilizing this comprehensive 
dataset, I developed three empirical essays, each addressing one of the proposed research 
questions.  
 Chapter 1: Growing Pains: The Hidden Dark Side of Design Iteration on Mobile 
Games Performance. The first essay in my dissertation challenges the well accepted 
perspective that design iteration is beneficial and incurs very little costs (Banbury & 
Mitchell, 1995; Lawless & Anderson, 1996). While strategy research mostly advises 
firms to capture generative value by continually introducing improvements on their 
existing products (Ahuja, Lampert, & Novelli, 2013), this paper scrutinizes the 
performance implications of design iteration and unveils a potential dark side. Consider 
an app update of Snapchat that caused widespread anger among users. The leading social 
networking app lost three million daily active users and suffered from 1.3 million USD 
loss in market value in the second quarter of 2018, for which its CEO Evan Spiegel 
blamed the newly released update that redesigns the user interface (New York Times, 
2018). These arguments and observations suggest considerable heterogeneity in the 
performance outcomes of design iteration, and underscore the need for further 
investigation given the corresponding implications for firms’ competitiveness. 
6 
 
I draw on the demand-side perspective to examine consumers’ product adoption 
following design iteration (Adner & Levinthal, 2001; Priem, 2007; Wang, Aggarwal, & 
Wu, 2020). Because design iteration brings changes to existing products that are already 
embedded in consumers’ behavioral patterns, I argue that they are likely to cause frictions 
by altering ingrained habits and increasing learning costs for consumers. As a result, I 
expect that consumers will be more likely to resist design iteration, rather than engage in 
behavioral adjustment, particularly in the short-term. Further, I posit that this negative 
effect of design iteration will diminish when the product has a leading market position; it 
will be more severe as the product undergoes more design iterations; and it will be 
attenuated when the platform the product is affiliated with has experienced a recent 
iteration. 
My empirical analysis utilizes a unique matched difference-in-differences 
research design using data from the mobile games industry. I recognize that design 
iteration is a deliberate choice made by firms. For example, seasonal holidays may breed 
a spike in product demand, and in response, firms are likely to introduce design iterations 
in advance. The identification strategy leverages asynchronous design iterations of 
multihoming mobile games (i.e., game apps available on more than one platform). By 
comparing the change in daily active users of the upgraded apps (i.e. treatment group) 
vis-à-vis the same apps that have yet to be upgraded on the rival platform (i.e. control 
group), I can minimize unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., developer traits, app 
characteristics, time effects, etc.). Based on 1,610 design iteration events in worldwide 
markets, I find supportive evidence for my hypotheses and discuss implications for 
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strategy and technology innovation literature. The demand-side costs of design iteration 
also provide an important basis for firms to strategize design iteration. 
Chapter 2: Design Iteration, Institutional Uncertainty, and Product Innovation: 
Evidence from the Global Mobile Application Industry. Being one of the first to infuse 
opportunity logic with the institutional perspective, my second essay theorizes how 
entrepreneurial firms in different country contexts capture innovation opportunities. The 
logic of opportunity suggests that firms must take actions of iterative search to capture 
the fleeting innovation opportunities in nascent industries (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; 
Ott, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2017). While this logic has considerably enhanced our 
understanding, it largely assumes a homogeneous institutional context, in which nascent 
industries are embedded.  
However, with the ubiquity of information and communication technologies, 
firms around the world can “plug and play” in global competition to foster the emergence 
of nascent industries in different institutional contexts (Chakravorti, Tunnard, & 
Chaturvedi, 2015). Although it is well accepted that institutional variation can influence 
firm innovation (e.g., Shinkle & McCann, 2014), little is known about how diverse 
institutional contexts associated with nascent industries may shape product innovation, 
and how firms should take iterative actions to navigate the heterogeneous landscapes.  
In addressing these questions, I investigate how various levels of institutional 
uncertainty affect firms’ product innovation. While nascent industries are characterized 
by substantial institutional uncertainty (Moeen, Agarwal, & Shah, 2020), its variation 
across countries is largely overlooked. From opportunity logic, the more uncertain the 
external environment, the greater the room for a firm to discover opportunities and to 
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innovate new products (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Eisenhardt, 2002). Conversely, 
institutional theorists maintain that firms face significant challenges to make long-term 
commitments under high uncertainty (Peng, 2003; Xu & Meyer, 2013; Banalieva, 
Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2015). Combining these contrasting theoretical perspectives, I 
propose that there is a U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty and product 
innovation in nascent industries.  
Moreover, I investigate how firms strategize design iteration to navigate 
institutional uncertainty and create product innovations. I argue that design iteration 
enables firms to engage in experiential learning, to sense and seize opportunities 
embedded in an uncertain and fast-changing setting. In turn, the newly created knowledge 
through iteration will help firms better develop innovative solutions to address the unmet 
needs in a particular market. Thus, I propose that firms frequently iterating product 
designs can better navigate high institutional uncertainty to create product innovations. 
Using a sample of 4,629 firms from 54 countries in the mobile app industry during year 
2015-2017, my empirical results based on negative binomial analysis provide support for 
all my hypotheses.  
This study makes several important contributions. First, I contribute to 
opportunity logic by highlighting institutional variation in nascent industries. Drawing 
upon such institutional variation, I am among the first to theorize and examine how firms 
should contextualize their iteration strategies to capture opportunities in different local 
contexts. Second, this study extends a dynamic view of institutions to examine the role of 
institutional uncertainty in innovation. While the institutional perspective mostly treats 
uncertainty as a challenge to overcome, I theorize that the influence of institutional 
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uncertainty is twofold, in which opportunities and challenges for innovation coexist. 
Third, this study also provides practical implications for digital entrepreneurs and policy 
makers.     
Chapter 3: Like Clockwork? Design Iteration Rhythms and the Strategy of Digital 
Startups. My third essay explores how digital startups strategize design iteration when 
competing in multiple markets simultaneously. Particularly, I focus on the understudied 
role of design iteration rhythms, exhibiting regular time intervals between design 
iterations. Extant literature suggests that rhythms help facilitate coordination and enable 
firms to be more focused (Ancona & Chong, 1996; Klarner & Raisch, 2013; Laamanen & 
Keil, 2008; Turner & Rindova, 2018; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Moreover, some 
very successful digital startups (e.g., SpaceApe) have attributed their extreme growth to 
the use of rhythm-related business practices (Batchelor, 2017; Gupta & Rood, 2012), and 
have strongly encouraged the approach of fixed time intervals for each cycle of design 
iteration. Despite the potential benefits, little consideration has been given to whether and 
under what conditions digital startups utilize rhythms to organize design iteration.  
To address this gap, I first examine whether digital startups use rhythms for 
design iterations. I draw on a coordination logic (Becker, 2004; Nelson & Winter, 1982) 
to argue that digital startups seek to diminish the difficulties in internal coordination and 
therefore develop rhythms to organize design iterations. In other words, the considerable 
opportunities for coordination efficiencies in design iteration drive these firms to develop 
rhythms. Further, I examine the boundary conditions of using design iteration rhythms, 
i.e., the conditions under which digital startups prefer to employ regular rhythms rather 
than rapidly respond to market changes. Specifically, I investigate how competing in 
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diverse markets may influence digital startups’ adherence to rhythmic design iterations. 
This is important because market diversification is not uncommon for digital startups, 
given their convenient access to multiple markets through digital affordances, e.g., iOS 
app store (Shaheer & Li, 2020; Tanriverdi̇ & Lee, 2008). I propose that two types of 
market diversification, platform diversification and international diversification, affect 
digital startups’ adherence to design iteration rhythms. I argue that these types of market 
diversification exert opposing influences on design iteration rhythms, given the distinct 
challenges in these diverse markets.  
Based on the parametric event history analysis of a sample of 110 mobile game 
startups, I find that digital startups tend to use rhythms for organizing design iterations. 
The basic argument is that rhythms help reduce coordination costs when firms are 
frequently engaged in design iteration. Moreover, international diversification hinders 
design iteration rhythms while platform diversification facilitates the use of rhythms. 
Since the opportunity landscapes are heterogeneous across countries, firms must be 
responsive when arranging design iterations and bear the incurred coordination costs. It 
suggests that digital startups configure design iteration rhythms to align with the 
diversification strategies. This study contributes to current understanding of how firms 
strategize entrepreneurial actions to simultaneously capture opportunities across different 
contexts. 
The three essays altogether contribute to the strategic logic of opportunity. First, 
my focus on digital firms’ innovation and learning activities calls for a new strategic 
logic that emphasizes opportunities. Extant strategy research has significantly advanced 
our understanding of the strategic logics firms use to compete and innovate (i.e., positions, 
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resources). Yet, traditional strategic logics encounter limitations explaining how digital 
unicorns soared in the past decade (e.g., Facebook, ByteDance) (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 
2008). Likewise, many of these digital firms I study in this dissertation do not start with 
unique assets like advanced technologies or differentiated product/service positionings. 
Instead, they are known for probing flows of attractive opportunities earlier than their 
competitors and are capable of continuously innovating new products/services to capture 
these fleeting opportunities better than others. Entrepreneurial actions that concern the 
sensing and seizing of opportunities, like iterations, are central to explaining why these 
firms probe and capture opportunities better than others.  
Second, iteration-related activities (e.g., design iteration) play a central role in 
explaining how firms employ opportunity logic in the digital marketplace. The “high-
velocity” (i.e., ambiguous, unpredictable, and fast-pace) of digital marketplaces limits 
planning and so favors entrepreneurial actions and adaptation (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 
2017). Specifically, I investigate how firms use design iteration to sense and seize 
opportunities and even transform them through continued renewal. My first essay 
explores how mobile game publishers seize opportunities by updating game designs to 
cater to the evolving needs of gamers. I find out that, despite the well-recognized positive 
aspects of iteration, seizing opportunities through iteration could be risky as it disrupts 
the ingrained habits of its consumers. My second essay sheds light on how app updates 
enable firms to better sense the emerging innovation opportunities under high 
institutional uncertainty. The trial-and-error nature of design iteration, thus, helps firms 
scan the market and learn about new changes in the market. The third essay goes beyond 
the direct implications of iteration and turns to understand what drives digital firms to 
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continuously iterate. I find that continuous iterations are regulated by well-orchestrated 
iteration rhythms to transform flows of opportunities. The three essays altogether strive to 
depict a picture of how firms capture opportunities by managing design iteration.  
Third, the role of timing is critical but severely understudied to explore firms’ use 
of opportunity logic. My exploration of publishers’ complex character of app updates 
reveals the distinct aspects of iteration strategies as they unfold and inter-relate over time. 
It points to the importance of understanding how digital firms strategize the timing of 
iteration over time. Notably, process-oriented studies, which center on the temporal flow 
of phenomena (Langley, 1999), have shed light on the role of timing for recurring 
activities. For instance, Bingham, Heimeriks, Schijven, and Gates (2015) found a 
backward sequence of learning to be the most effective in capturing opportunities. My 
second essay indicates that frequent iterations over time enable firms to better probe into 
the opportunities. Moreover, it is suggested that the temporal patterns of actions are 
critical to understand how entrepreneurs enact and capture opportunities. Recent 
development of entrepreneurship research has illustrated that opportunities require an 
iterative process of action and reaction to be enacted (Alvarez and Barney, 2007:15). 
Entrepreneurs engage the opportunities by entraining the timing of important 
stakeholders together (e.g., venture capitals, customers, employees). If rhythms are not 
well aligned among stakeholders, opportunity enactment cannot continue (Wood & 
McKinley, 2017). In my third essay, I find that a time-paced rhythm is conducive to 
organize internal employees to synchronize iteration-related activities. Therefore, how 




While focusing on the strategic logic of opportunity, my dissertation takes an 
initial but important step toward extending international business research in this 
dynamic and fast-changing setting. As opportunity logic is quickly emerging in the 
strategy and entrepreneurship fields, it is important for us to understand how international 
business theoretical frameworks can contribute to this important venue. Opportunity logic 
exhibits significant affinity to integrate with international business wisdom. 
Environmental dynamism is argued to be a highly relevant condition determining the 
extent to which opportunity logic works from its own definition (Schilke, Hu, & Helfat, 
2018). The role of context, which is central to international business scholarship, has also 
been recognized as the most frequently studied boundary condition in opportunity logic 
(Barreto, 2010). However, most of these studies ignore the significant variation across 
country contexts. Cross-country differences in terms of institutional underpinnings could 
shape the opportunity landscape in different ways, providing a unique perspective to 
explain how institutional environment contextualizes firms’ use of opportunity logic.  
Given the importance of the integration between traditional strategic logics and 
the institutional perspective (Peng et al., 2008), I see it as an important initiative to 
channel this emerging strategic logic with the wisdom of institutional theorists. I 
recognize that various institutional contexts may shape opportunity landscapes in 
different ways (North, 1990), requiring firms to strategize differently to capture 
opportunities. Specifically, my second essay examines how mobile app publishers should 
contextualize the frequency of app updates to pursue innovation opportunities under 
different levels of institutional uncertainty, while the third essay explores how digital 
startups orchestrate rhythms of updates when competing simultaneously across many 
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different country markets. I find that firms should frequently iterate product designs when 
they are embedded in a country with high institutional uncertainty, and should employ a 
flexible iteration rhythm when faced with multiple different country markets.  
I also acknowledge that my theorization in this study has important limitations in 
terms of generalizability. An assumption of a high-velocity market, such as nascent 
industries, underlies the use of opportunity logic (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2008). 
Attractive flows of opportunities may result in superior performance in this context 
because valuable resources and differential positions are short-lived and can be quickly 
rendered obsolete. Thus, my theoretical arguments can be well applied to industrial 
environments that are characterized by unpredictable and rapid changes. In relatively 
stable markets, iteration may still enable firms to learn but should be considered less 
effective. Moreover, my focus on the digital sector assumes a highly flexible and agile 
product development process, which greatly enhances firms' capability to capture fleeting 
opportunities. In nascent industries where product development takes much longer (e.g., 
biotech), the emerged opportunities are difficult to be probed and captured before they 
become outdated. Nevertheless, with the strong momentum of digitalization, I expect that 
the product development processes would be transformed in many industries, enabling 
more firms to capture opportunities rapidly. In sum, this dissertation goes beyond digital 
and high-tech industries and sheds light on how firms deal with the turbulent and 




GROWING PAINS: THE HIDDEN DARK SIDE OF DESIGN 
ITERATION ON MOBILE GAMES PERFORMANCE 
 
Abstract: Strategy research advises firms to capture generative value by continually 
introducing generational improvements on their existing products. This paper considers a 
potential dark side of such strategy. I argue that design iteration may elicit a negative 
response from consumers, as it distorts their ingrained behavioral patterns and imposes 
learning costs. Further, I propose that this negative effect of design iteration will diminish 
when the product has a leading market position; it will be more severe as the product 
undergoes more iterations; and it will be attenuated when the platform the product is 
affiliated with has experienced a recent design iteration. Using a difference-in-differences 
design based on mobile game apps that multihome on two platforms, I find supportive 
evidence for my hypotheses and discuss implications for strategy and technology 
innovation literature. 
 





A central topic in strategy research concerns how firms can appropriate value from their 
own innovations (Teece, 1986). Recently, scholars have drawn attention to the idea of 
generative appropriability as an important second-order form of value appropriation, 
which reflects the effectiveness in capturing value through future innovations that are 
spawned by the current one (Ahuja, Lampert, & Novelli, 2013). A firm can appropriate 
generative value by continually introducing improved generations of its original 
innovation, before others develop substitutes based on that innovation. This is a 
particularly prominent practice in technology industries where existing product 
innovations are frequently supplanted by subsequent generations of products (Helfat & 
Raubitschek, 2000), and in the context of digital platforms where firms rely on 
generational innovation as a dominant appropriability strategy that preempts competitive 
imitation (Miric, Boudreau, & Jeppesen, 2019). It has been argued that these generational 
innovations account for the vast majority of economic value created by innovating firms 
(Pisano, 2015). Yet few studies have empirically investigated their performance 
implications. 
This inadequacy of evidence is troubling given the normative emphasis on 
generational innovation as an appropriability strategy that enables firms to sustain 
advantages. Scholars have indeed noted that innovations that enhance firms’ 
competencies may unwittingly destroy consumer value (Afuah, 2000). By extension, 
those introducing generational innovations to enhance generative appropriability could 
run the risk of consumer backlash against unwelcome product upgrades. This echoes the 
fact that firms commonly face high failure rates with their innovations (Moore, 1991). 
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Consider a recent major app redesign by Snapchat that caused widespread anger among 
users. The leading social networking app lost three million daily active users in the 
second quarter of 2018, for which CEO Evan Spiegel blamed the product redesign (New 
York Times, 2018). Likewise, the first generational upgrade of the hit game Pokémon 
GO sparked a significant outcry on social media (CNBC, 2016). These arguments and 
observations from practice suggest considerable heterogeneity in the performance 
outcomes of generational innovation, and underscore the need for further investigation 
given the corresponding implications for firms’ competitiveness.  
In addressing this gap, I focus on design iteration, through which firms test and 
tune product designs based on market feedback (Chen, Wang, Cui, & Li, 2020). In line 
with the arguments for generative appropriability, extant literature tends to emphasize the 
benefits of design iteration for the firm, as introducing design iterations can help 
incumbents survive industry evolution and maximize returns from their initial 
investments in innovation (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Miric & Jeppesen, 2020). Yet the 
literature has provided surprisingly little evidence as to how this pursuit of generative 
appropriability may affect product performance.  
I draw on the demand-side perspective to examine consumers’ product adoption 
following design iteration (Adner & Levinthal, 2001; Priem, 2007; Wang, Aggarwal, & 
Wu, 2020). Because design iteration brings changes to existing products that are already 
embedded in consumers’ behavioral patterns, I argue that they are likely to cause frictions 
by altering ingrained habits and increasing learning costs for consumers. As a result, I 
expect that consumers will be more likely to resist design iteration, rather than engage in 
behavioral adjustment, particularly in the short-term. Further, I posit that the negative 
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effect of design iteration will vary depending on the relative benefits of adoption for 
consumers vis-à-vis their behavioral adjustment required. I argue that the negative effect 
will diminish when the product has a leading market position; it will be more severe as 
the product undergoes more design iterations; and it will be attenuated when the platform 
the product is affiliated with has experienced a recent design iteration.  
Our empirical analysis focuses on the short-term ramifications of design iteration. 
My assumption is that the functional advantages offered by design iteration may 
themselves be short-lived because of abrupt obsolescence in wake of constant market and 
technological changes (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Tripsas, 1997). This dynamism is, in 
fact, the very reason for the ongoing release of design iterations in a bid to create long-
lasting appeal for the product (Lawless & Anderson, 1996), as the accumulation of short-
term advances can have profound implications for the firm’s long-term success (Helfat & 
Winter, 2011). Moreover, I recognize that design iteration is a deliberate choice made by 
firms. For example, seasonal holidays may breed a spike in product demand, and in 
response, firms are likely to introduce design iterations in advance. To address the 
corresponding endogeneity issue, my analysis utilizes a unique matched difference-in-
differences research design using data from the mobile games industry. The identification 
strategy leverages asynchronous design iterations of multihoming mobile games (i.e., 
game apps available on more than one platform). By comparing the change in daily 
active users of the upgraded apps (i.e. treatment group) vis-à-vis the same apps that have 
yet to be upgraded on the rival platform (i.e. control group), I can minimize unobserved 
heterogeneity (e.g., developer traits, app characteristics, time effects, etc.). I find 
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evidence in support of my hypotheses, based on 1,610 design iteration events in 
worldwide markets.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Generative appropriability and design iteration  
Strategy research has largely focused on first-order appropriability, which refers to a 
firm's effectiveness in exploiting a given innovation by translating it into financial returns 
(James, Leiblein, & Lu, 2013). Studies of such appropriability seek to identify, among the 
various possible business models, the best approach to monetizing a firm’s existing 
innovation (Teece, 1986). Far less attention has been paid to generative appropriability as 
an important second-order element of appropriability, which concerns the firm’s 
effectiveness in capturing the greatest share of future innovations that are spawned from 
its origianl innovation (Ahuja et al., 2013; Alnuaimi & George, 2016).  
To further understand generative appropriability, I build on previous research on 
design iteration through which firms test and tune product designs within a technological 
regime (Banbury & Mitchell, 1995; Chen et al., 2020; Turner, Mitchell, & Bettis, 2010). 
A technological regime, or trajectory, is a commonly-accepted set of technical principles 
for generating solutions to particular technological problems (Cohen, 2010; Nelson & 
Winter, 1977). Within a regime, technological development proceeds along a relatively 
clear path drawing on familiar methods of solution. As illustrative examples, the 
transition in operating systems to Windows 10 from its predecessor (Windows 8) would 
be within a technological regime, and therefore a design iteration; by contrast, a shift 
from Windows to Linux represents a change of technological regime and thus would not 
be considered a design iteration. Other examples are widely seen in automotive and 
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consumer electronics industries where model upgrades are introduced regularly. Recently 
design iterations have become particularly prevalent in the digital economy, as the 
flexible nature of software-based products allows for continual improvements over the 
product lifecycle (Lobel et al., 2016; MacCormack, Verganti, & Iansiti, 2001; Tschang, 
2007).  
In previous work, researchers have attempted to understand whether and under 
what conditions firms introduce design iteration. The release of design iteration tends to 
exhibit a consistent temporal pattern given the critical role of routines in developing and 
introducing products (Turner et al., 2013). Not only is design iteration driven by a firm’s 
own innovation strategy featuring temporal consistency, it also can be a response to 
external events such as competitors’ innovations (Turner et al., 2010). From the view of 
performance implications of design iteration, existing studies have emphasized its 
benefits for firms. Design iterations can help them respond to consumers’ changing tastes 
and maximize returns from firms’ initial investments in innovation (Ansari, Garud, & 
Kumaraswamy, 2016; Lawless & Anderson, 1996). That design iteration can improve 
firms’ competitiveness during technology evolution seems taken for granted. Yet how 
design iteration affects consumer utility and product performance remains a black box.  
Demand-side perspective on technology innovation 
A parallel line of research in the technology innovation literature is the demand-side 
perspective, which concerns consumers’ evaluation of products’ functional performance 
(Priem, Li, & Carr, 2012). While often implicit, the underlying premise revolves around 
how consumers react to innovation. To date, demand-side studies in technology 
innovation research have focused on customer-oriented innovation strategy for value 
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creation (Danneels, 2003). As with innovation diffusion studies (Rogers, 2003), this work 
largely follows a pro-change approach and typically presumes that technology 
innovations bringing novel solutions and improvements over existing alternatives tend to 
ultimately be adopted by consumers (Garcia, Bardhi, and Friedrich, 2007). Researchers 
thus are more concerned with antecedents to the diffusion of an innovation rather than 
focusing on factors that inhibit its diffusion. 
This is not without exceptions. Adner and Snow (2010) show that some consumer 
segments for an existing product may perceive little utility from the new features 
associated with a technological transition. Mainstream consumers are often found to be 
reluctant to adopt new products based on disruptive technologies because the attribute set 
being offered is misaligned with their functional preferences (Christensen, 1992; 
Christensen & Bower, 1996). More importantly, studies of technological changes have 
investigated how and why they may harm incumbent firms’ customers (Afuah & Bahram, 
1995). Using the case of the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985), Afuah (2000) illustrates 
the possibility that innovations that enhance incumbents’ competencies may unwittingly 
render obsolete consumers’ accumulated skills and knowledge and thus destroy consumer 
value. Overall, though, scant attention has been paid to the changes that innovations may 
impose on consumers and the fact that consumers may have natural resistance to such 
changes (Heidenreich & Handrich, 2015; Oreg, 2003). 
Furthermore, extant work on technology innovation is based on the assumption 
that consumer utility derived from a product innovation corresponds to the level of 
performance improvements it offers (Adner, 2002). Building on a firm’s existing product, 
design iterations commonly improve on the product attributes or the relationships among 
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these attributes (Moreau, Lehmann, & Markman, 2001). This has directed much attention 
to the benefits of design iteration as an incremental approach for advancing along an 
existing technological trajectory, but not as a source of disruption. This research omission 
may be due to a potential conflation between incremental innovation and design iteration. 
While both utilize established technical principles, extend design on existing products 
and fit with the firm’s current customer base (Henderson & Clark, 1990), design iteration 
is distinct as it incurs substantial changes to consumers by altering an existing product or 
transforming its scope (Turner et al., 2010). The potential negative consequences may 
only occur when changes involve new functionality and significant shift of existing 
functionality and design. Nonetheless, because of its evolutionary nature, design iteration 
is subsumed under the broader literature on incremental innovation, without due 
consideration of the disturbances it might cause (Moreau et al., 2001).  
The dark side of design iteration 
Following the demand-side perspective, I attribute consumers’ adoption of a design 
iteration to their evaluation of the upgraded product. By definition, design iteration 
provides additional functional attributes for consumers, which can add to consumer utility 
and generate additional demand and sales (Banbury & Mitchell, 1995). However, the 
improvement on some performance dimensions may be accompanied by the loss of 
benefits on others, and as a result, the net utility change created by functional extensions 
should not be assumed (Mukherjee & Hoyer, 2001).  
We argue that for many consumers the original product is already embedded in 
their existing patterns of behavior. Scholars in psychology show that individuals develop 
habits to engage in particular patterns of behavior in response to stable contextual cues, 
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based on their performing activities repeatedly in similar contexts (Ouellette & Wood, 
1998; Wood & Neal, 2007). As individuals often seek such stability and consistency, 
changes that distort habits can be disturbing (Oreg, 2003). For example, researchers find 
that information technology users do not willingly embrace change, but prefer 
innovations that cause no change to the status quo (Rivard and Lapointe, 2012). Design 
iterations which unsettle ingrained consumption habits may elicit a negative evaluative 
response from consumers because changes inhibiting habitual responses demand 
additional cognitive resources (Quinn et al., 2010) and consumers will be forced to 
undergo a prolonged process of behavioral adjustment before they can reach the same 
level of comfort as with the past product generation (Chen and Hitt, 2002; Ram, 1989). 
Furthermore, I argue that while design iteration is intended to capture generative 
value by introducing innovative features to the market, they also impose learning costs 
upon consumers which can be value destroying. Design iteration confronts consumers 
with costs for accepting new contents, for which some accumulated knowledge may 
become less efficacious and new skills must be learned (Afuah, 2000). Learning costs 
involve cognitive efforts on how to operate the new product and benefit from the 
technical advances (Garcia et al., 2007; Mukherjee and Hoyer, 2001). 
Meanwhile, it is unreasonable to assume that consumers can fully exploit the 
functional benefits in the short term. Distracted by the short-term inconvenience, 
consumers may be resistant to a new feature regardless of the substance of its benefits 
(Hong et al., 2011). The reluctance for altering established behaviors and skills prompts 
consumers to refrain from investing in learning, even if they may subscribe to the change 
in principle over the long term. For average consumers, the perceived cost of enduring 
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the adjustment period may outweigh the potential benefits to be extracted in the long term, 
such that consumers may view design iteration more as an immediate disruption. 
Commenting on the recent design iteration, a Snapchat spokesperson admitted that 
“updates as big as this one can take a little getting used to…but I hope the community 
will enjoy it once they settle in” (CNN, 2018). Yet millions of once active users opened 
the app less frequently as a result of the significant redesign.  
Hence I posit that the introduction of a design iteration will reduce overall market 
demand for and adoption of the product. This is because the disturbances consumers 
perceive and the learning costs they assume exert a negative impact on product 
evaluation.  
H1: The introduction of a design iteration reduces consumers’ adoption of the product.  
Moderation of relative benefits 
Critical in demand-side understanding of innovation success is a focus on the varying 
extent to which consumers value technology-driven performance improvements (Adner 
and Levinthal, 2001; Aggarwal and Wu, 2015; Wang et al., 2020). As argued, this may 
be based on inferences about the benefits afforded by a design iteration relative to its 
potential negative effects, i.e., disturbances to consumers’ established behavior. The 
relative (net) benefits that consumers expect to extract determine their overall evaluation 
of the new product generation and hence how consumers will respond to the release of a 
design iteration. Prior research suggests that a firm’s market position, experience with 
prior innovations, and changes in foundational technology can shape its tendency to 
engage in innovation (Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon, 2008; Beck, Brüderl, and Woywode, 
2008; Klevorick et al., 1995). Yet little evidence has been gathered on innovation 
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outcomes. Extending the studies of innovation behavior, I propose that market position, 
prior iterations, and platform iteration can influence innovation outcomes on the demand 
side. These factors, which capture salient market and technology dimensions, do so by 
shifting the potential benefits and costs associated with a design iteration, thereby 
moderating the observed effect. 
Market position 
As a product attains a market-leading position, I expect the negative effect of design 
iteration on consumer adoption to weaken for two reasons. First, the benefits of adoption 
are likely to be amplified. Due to limited information processing capacity, consumers 
tend to rely on external signals such as rankings in adoption decisions (Rietveld and 
Eggers, 2018). It is reasonable to assume that the functional attributes of leading products 
have been configured in a way that addresses the needs of the broader base of customers 
(Slater and Mohr, 2006). Thus, embracing market-leading products helps to minimize 
search efforts, as well as the ex post uncertainty associated with design iterations. 
Furthermore, consumers’ evaluation metrics may evolve as the product becomes 
increasingly successful and popular. Instead of basing product evaluation on tradeoffs 
between certain functional attributes, consumers may converge toward a preoccupation to 
satisfy social needs, i.e. “to get into the ‘swim of things’” and “to be fashionable or 
stylish” (Leibenstein, 1950: 189). From this perspective, ceasing to use the renewed 
product or seeking alternatives will force consumers to forego the enjoyment arising from 
the related social interactions. Therefore, the benefits of adopting the latest product 
design are higher for market-leading products than the others, all else equal.  
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 Second, I expect the behavioral costs of design iteration for consumers to be 
smaller for products that are ranked high in the market. Consumers acquire knowledge 
about a product via social learning, and such social learning occurs commonly in 
consumer communities, including various online ones (Fisher, 2019). Research shows 
that the extent to which consumers can attain information-based learning depends on the 
size of the community (Hu, Yang, and Xu, 2019). For market-leading products, 
consumers will have a greater social community to learn from, instead of having to learn 
how to adapt to a new product design on their own. Networks of friends and strangers 
offer knowledge about the new tools, techniques, tips and tricks. Such knowledge can 
reduce the barrier to acquiring new skills specific to the iteration, and enable consumers 
to benefit from technical advances without engaging in extensive learning. Given the 
increased benefits and reduced behavioral costs consumers face, products’ market 
position will weaken the negative effect of design iteration.  
H2: The decrease in consumer adoption of the product in response to a design iteration 
will be weaker when the product has attained a market-leading position.  
Prior iterations 
As the number of prior iterations increases, I expect the negative effect of design iteration 
to be magnified for two reasons. First, more design iterations introduced for a given 
product will lead to a longer technological legacy. As this legacy lengthens, updates in 
functionality may complicate the interface, require additional resources, and may lead to 
integration breakdown (Hann, Koh, and Niculescu, 2016), such that users face more 
hurdles and impediments in extracting the benefits associated with the design iteration. 
For example, Minecraft players constantly complain that functional changes in new 
27 
 
updates are not compatible with game mechanics in an older version and they must fix 
damages on the resources they have built before utilizing the latest improvements 
(Thompson, 2016). Delays may arise for consumers as a result of efforts to ensure that 
the new product features and functional advances sync with a growing number of early 
iterations. Thus, I expect consumers to be less motivated to change their existing patterns 
of behaviour, as they perceive fewer benefits in the latest product design. 
 Second, consumers who have stayed with the product through many iterations are 
likely to have developed consistent behavioral patterns and become increasingly reluctant 
to experience the learning and behavioral costs. Frequent design iterations not only have 
imposed extra burden on consumers’ capacity for behavioral adjustment, but any 
additional change may also increase the risk of disrupting ingrained consumption habits. 
While it may be the case that consumers have shown that they are willing to experience 
these costs in the past, psychologists have argued that disrupting a habit is a taxing 
process that requires and drains resources like willpower and self-control (Neal, Wood, 
and Drolet, 2013; Quinn et al., 2010). In relative terms, that increases the perceived 
learning costs and behavioral adjustments involved with a new design iteration. The more 
that consumers have experienced prior design iterations (i.e., disrupted their habits), the 
less energy, resources and even interest they may have to adopt again. Overall, I posit 
that the negative effect of design iteration is amplified when the product has experienced 





H3: The decrease in consumer adoption of the product in response to a design iteration 
will be greater when the product has experienced more iterations.  
Platform iteration 
When the platform the product is affiliated with experiences a recent iteration, I expect 
the negative effect of the product’s design iteration to be attenuated for two reasons. First, 
consumers will expect to realize additional functional benefits given the platform’s 
iteration. In the digital economy, platform-based products are viewed as complementary 
to and interdependent on the platform technology (Cennamo and Santalo, 2013). For 
instance, in mobile computing industries, what consumers can expect to achieve with 
mobile apps depends on the operating system (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 2014). When 
there is design iteration at the platform level, it shines a light (focuses attention) on the 
foundational technology and related industries (similar to the way the computing industry 
used to be top of mind for consumers and producers during the COMDEX trade show). 
As such, one would expect consumers to allocate more time and attention to the platform 
technology and complementary products in general. That may elicit positive perception 
of the short-term benefits associated with the functional improvements introduced by 
complementary products. Hence, consumers will be better prepared to explore the 
product’s design iteration and extract functional benefits. 
 Second, when there is design iteration at the platform level, that change in the 
technological environment should reduce the disruptive effect of design iteration on 
consumers. Psychologists show that as individuals perform activities repeatedly in similar 
contexts, they develop stronger associations between the stable features of the context 
and how they perform the activity (Aarts, Verplanken, and van Knippenberg, 1998; 
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Ouellette and Wood, 1998). When there is a shift in the context, such associations tend to 
weaken, and habits are less likely to drive individuals’ behavior to the same extent 
(Wood, Tam, and Witt, 2005). Platform iteration represents an upstream intervention 
leading to a shift in the technological environment (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; 
Kretschmer and Claussen, 2016). In the altered environment where platform iteration 
causes widespread changes across complementary products, the stimuli that trigger the 
consumers’ habitual behaviors are less likely to be present. And even if the same stimuli 
are present, when the environment is altered, consumers will be less likely to be as reliant 
on their formed habits and expectations. This is especially true when the environmental 
change can be predicted or communicated to consumers (Verplanken and Wood, 2006), 
in much the same way as how platform iteration works in the digital economy. Hence, the 
disruption on habitual behaviors will be overshadowed when there is a shift in the 
surrounding context. Given increased benefits afforded by a new platform iteration and 
reduced disruptions to consumers’ behavioral patterns, platform iteration will render the 
negative effect of design iteration weaker.  
H4: The decrease in consumer adoption of the product in response to a design iteration 
will be weaker when the platform the product is affiliated with has experienced a recent 
iteration.  
DATA AND METHODS 
Research context and data 
In this study, I examine how design iteration affects near-term demand, specifically 
consumer adoption, in the context of the mobile app industry. This industry provides an 
apt empirical setting in which to investigate the interplay between design iteration and 
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demand side responses. Games are the largest category in the mobile app industry, both 
in terms of share of the total number of mobile apps (e.g., 24.9% in iOS) and revenues 
(e.g., in terms of revenue, seven of the top 10 apps subcategories are part of the games 
category). In addition, a significant group of mobile game users spend tremendous 
amounts of time and money to explore the gameplay and improve their skills. Such 
investment is game-specific, and the knowledge and credits do not transfer across games. 
This makes gamers relatively reluctant to switch games, so that the user disruption I seek 
to capture is not a mundane activity. More importantly, these gamers are the primary 
source of revenues for mobile game developers. Thus, any disruption based on existing 
users is a critical concern for mobile game developers. 
A scope condition of my theory is that the design iteration is a ubiquitous and 
important tool in firms’ arsenal. This is clearly the case for mobile games. I find that the 
update rate of game apps is among the highest in the apps industry. To gain greater 
insights into the context, I conducted interviews with several developers of game apps. 
One described the importance of updates as follows: “Update is a question of life or death 
for a mobile game, because users would get bored playing the same game within a month. 
The best way to survive is to update new content regularly.” Another developer 
highlighted that, “among different types of updates, those major updates are the most 
important, as they include substantial changes to the original design, expend most firm 
resources, and have the highest potential to generate revenues.” Thus, the mobile game 




Our study focuses on design iteration, i.e., significant technical advances/change 
relative to the existing product, and I exclude minor and “bugfix” updates. Although 
technical performance may improve as a result of any update, prior work suggests that 
the significance of the advance is limited, and primarily corrective, in the case of minor 
and bugfix releases. To distinguish design iteration from other innovation updates, I 
leverage a common practice for naming the updated version of games in the mobile game 
industry. According to this practice, version numbers are based on three digits (i.e., 
Version 1.2.0, 3.7.2). When releasing a new version, there will be an increment in the 
first-digit if significant changes are involved in the form of new contents, new functions 
and features, new game designs, and new game play modes; an increment in the second-
digit denotes minor improvements on existing features/functions, and an increment in the 
third-digit suggests involves bugfixes or marginal changes. In other words, an increment 
in the first-digit represents a substantial technical advance relative to the existing product 
design. It represents functional advances along the same technological trajectory, yet 
much more substantial advances than second-digit changes. I discussed the concept and 
measurement of design iteration with mobile game developers and product managers who 
are in charge of game updates, or LiveOps in their jargon. They confirmed that 
operationalizing design iteration as an increase in the first digit is an appropriate way to 
distinguish from minor, maintenance-oriented updates.1 Doing so allows us to capture 
design iteration in much the same way as I and other scholars have operationalized it. 
 
1 During the interviews, practitioners suggest that there is a small portion of mobile 
games that do not ever change the first digit of their game version names, despite that 
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To test my hypotheses about the effects of design iteration on consumers’ 
adoption of the product, I acquired data from a leading analyst firm in the mobile 
intelligence sector. The analyst firm tracks and archives information related to all mobile 
apps developed for the iOS platform. Its data are extensively used by app developers, 
venture capital firms, and financial analysts. The data set comprises detailed mobile apps 
information for the period from Jan 1st 2015 to Dec 31th 2017 across the 58 major country 
markets on both iOS and Google play app stores that were available from the analyst firm. 
I obtained information on app updates, adoption and basic app characteristics from the 
analyst firm. While the intelligence firm is widely viewed as a legitimate source of 
industry data/information, as a further check on the validity of the data, I verified that 
rankings and ratings of the top 20 apps in my acquired data matched corresponding 
information from two other providers of mobile apps data (most mobile app data 
providers offer free access to select information on recent top ranked apps). 
Matching and difference-in-differences approach 
Given that the timing of generational innovation might be strategic and therefore 
endogenous, I apply difference-in-differences approaches to overcome biases related to 
potential time trends (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). To construct treatment 
and control groups in difference-in-differences design, a common approach is to use 
propensity score matching, which matches the samples by trajectories of the dependent 
variable before the occurrence of the event (Kovács & Sharkey, 2014). However, this 
approach can still be subject to severe problems with unobservable variables (e.g., app 
 
some of the updates they release are deemed rather major ones. To this end, I consider 
my measurement of design iteration to be conservative.  
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theme, firm strategy, managerial composition) due to the limited availability of variables. 
Unobserved firm and product level characteristics may contribute to the divergence of 
trajectories after the design iteration. In other words, the design iteration decision could 
still be confounded by unobserved variables. Ideally, the empirical concern would be 
minimized if I could compare the demand of two identical apps (i.e., “twins”) produced 
by the same firm observed at the same time with only one experiencing treatment (i.e., 
experiencing generational product innovation). In fact, in the mobile app context, multi-
homing/cross-platform apps can provide a “quasi” experiment context to allow for 
comparisons between “twins”. To a large extent, the same app on different platforms 
share identical characteristics at both the firm and product level. If I control for the 
platform effect and some factors at the app-platform level (e.g., ranking), the decision to 
first update the app on one platform would be close to a random treatment. Therefore, I 
paired twin-apps from different platforms together so that I could address the prevailing 
endogeneity concerns in the examination of design iteration outcomes (Tiwana, 2015). 
Following prior literature using mobile apps datasets (Ghose and Han, 2014; 
Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017), I employed a “top segmentation” approach. The distribution 
of app revenues and downloads is heavily skewed and exhibits a long-tail shape. Based 
on a joint report by Prior Data and Pollen VC, more than half (55%) of the app store 
revenue in 2015 was generated by the top 100 apps, with the rest taken up by the other 
1,500,000 apps (Macmillan, 2015). Further, when consumers are browsing apps by 
category, the Apple App Store only shows top apps on its page—searching by keywords 
is required to reach the rest—creating a huge difference in market exposure between top 
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apps and others (Ghose and Han, 2014). Thus, top ranked apps represent a major part of 
the apps industry.  
To construct the sample, I started with a list of top ranked apps on iOS, then 
found the identical twins for them on Android, and concluded by going through a series 
of steps to identify suitable design iteration events for my study. Following Kapoor and 
Agarwal (2017), I first selected top grossing apps that ranked in the top 500 in each 
month from Jan 2015 to Dec 2017 in 58 countries in the iOS game category, generating a 
sample with 7,398 apps. To construct matched pairs for DID analysis, I searched for the 
counterparts of these iOS game apps on the Android platform from the same data source, 
and I found 3,187 of them that have released equivalent apps in the Android platform. 
That provided us with 3,187 pairs of cross-platform mobile game apps (released on both 
Android and iOS platforms). 
To ensure that the same apps on different platforms share very similar product 
characteristics, I screened all 3,187 pairs of apps in the sample to identify the focal design 
iteration events. First, I identified paired updates (design iteration, minor or bugfixes) that 
share the same version names between the cross-platform apps (15,115 paired updates). 
During my inspection of data and interviews with app developers, I found that the same 
app on different platforms may still be somewhat different from each other in update 
progress and product design. However, when version names (e.g., 3.4.2) for the same app 
on different platforms are the same, the update progress and product characteristics are 
most likely to be very similar. To ensure that the focal updates take place when both 
treatment and control groups share very similar product characteristics, I start by focusing 
on the paired updates that share the same version names on different platforms. Second, I 
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dropped out those paired updates if one of them had experienced any type of updates 
shortly after the matched updates (less than 7 days) the matched update, so as not to 
confound the influence of paired updates with the focal update.2 That led to 2,032 paired 
updates. Third, I kept the pairs if either one of them experienced the focal update, while 
the other one was not updated for at least 7 days after the counterpart’s focal update. To 
isolate the effect of the focal update, I also excluded pairs that have experienced 
additional updates right after the focal update within one week. In doing so, I generated a 
7-day period after the focal update in which the counterpart app was yet to update, 
leaving us with 1,706 paired updates. Finally, I kept the paired updates corresponding to 
focal updates that are qualified as design iterations based on the criteria mentioned earlier. 
These focal updates must have increments in the first-digit of their version names 
compared to the version names of the paired updates. In summary, I had a final sample of 
1,610 focal design iteration events occurring across apps and country markets. Figure 1.1 
helps illustrate my sampling procedures. I treated the date of focal design iteration as day 
0 and keep data that ranges from day -7 to day 7 for each selected pair. In this way, the 
matched samples are equivalent in unobserved covariates at the firm level, product level 
and even product-day level unobserved covariates.   
In econometrics terms, my regressions follow the difference-in-differences 
approach. The identification of the treatment effect relies on comparing changes in 
adoption over time between apps that experienced generational product innovations 
during the observation window and the matched apps that are identical but operate on 
different platforms and did not experience the design iteration event. In statistical 
 
2 Most mobile game users update new versions within the first 4-5 days.   
36 
 
modeling, I followed previous studies to conduct pooled regressions that include 
matched-dyad fixed effects, or in other words, app fixed effects (Azoulay, Stuart, & 
Wang, 2014; Kovács & Sharkey, 2014; Singh & Agrawal, 2011). 
While cross-platform twins provide us with a unique context that matches exactly 
for developer-level characteristics (size, age, experience, etc.) and app-level 
characteristics (genre, contents, quality, etc.), they may exhibit different adoption 
trajectories across time, mostly due to the platform effect (platform-specific regulations, 
consumers’ preferences for app features, consumers’ willingness to pay, etc.). Therefore, 
I must examine the “common trend assumption” (or sometimes known as parallel path 
assumption) frequently required before running difference-in-differences (DID) tests. 
Following the procedure of Asgari, Singh, and Mitchell (2017), I employed both 
graphical and statistical assessments of the common trend assumption. I graphed the 
values of the outcome variable across the treatment and control groups to compare the 
average change trend before the event. Both treatment and control groups had very 
similar trends of daily active users prior to the design iteration event at day 8. Further, the 
number of daily active users for the treatment group (experiencing design iteration at day 
8) does not increase as fast as the control group after the design iteration. I also 
conducted Stata procedure “didq” to assess the plots statistically (Mora and Reggio, 
2015). The results indicate that the null hypotheses of common trend cannot be rejected, 
supporting the validity of the assumption. 
Variables 
Dependent variable. To capture the instant change in near-term demand around design 
iteration, I measured consumer adoption of a mobile game by the number of consumers 
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that use the app on a specific day in the focal country market. In order to normalize its 
distribution, I log-transformed the measure such that consumer adoption equals to ln 
(number of daily active users + 1). By log-transforming the number of consumers, I 
capture the within-app percent change in consumer adoption as a function of the design 
iteration event and covariates (Greene, 2003; Wang et al., 2020). Similar measures of 
count within a specific time interval (e.g., day, week, month) have been frequently 
adopted to gauge consumers’ usage of online games, mobile apps, or social networking 
services (Kovács & Sharkey, 2014; Tiwana, 2015; Toubia & Stephen, 2013). 
 Independent variables. Given that I seek to examine research questions with the 
matched difference-in-differences design, I are interested in the significance level and 
magnitude of the difference estimator (Bertrand et al., 2004). The difference estimator is 
the interaction of the treatment and post dummy variables. The treatment variable is a 
dummy variable, which is coded as 1 for the app-platform that experiences a design 
iteration in the observation window and 0 for the control group. The post variable is also 
a dummy variable, which receives a value of 1 from day 0 to day 7 and 0 from day -7 to 
day -1. In essence, the difference estimator captures whether the dependent variable has 
changed at a significantly different rate for the treated group as compared to the control 
group. 
Moderators. According to my theory development, the treatment effect of design 
iteration would vary across samples based on the relative benefits consumers can extract 
from design iterations. Therefore, I included market position, prior iterations, and 
platform iteration as moderators to construct triple difference models. First, I expect that 
market position on a platform will influence the negative effect of a design iteration event. 
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While market share, market growth or other related variables are often employed to 
characterize the market position in traditional industries (e.g., Hopkins, 1987), market 
position in digital platforms is very straightforward. Mobile app ranking lists capture the 
market positions of different apps based on their recent demand, rewarding popular apps 
with salient market visibility and a trendy appeal (Ifrach and Johari, 2014). Since ranking 
lists aggregate information about the usage decisions of all other app users, they reduce 
the uncertainty consumers face regarding the value of apps they have not used. Given that 
most ranking lists only show the top 30 ranked apps in a category list, I included an 
indicator of market position for the focal app on the focal country-platform, coding as 1 if 
the focal app has reached top 30 in the local market ranking, 0 otherwise. Second, prior 
iterations may also moderate how the upcoming design iteration affect consumer 
adoption. The number of prior iterations for the focal app captures its cumulative 
innovation history and demand dynamics  (Eggers & Rietveld, 2018). I used the number 
of prior design iterations before the focal day (log-transformed) as the measure of prior 
generations. Third, platform iteration represents upstream interventions leading to a shift 
in the technological environment (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Kretschmer and Claussen, 
2016). I measured platform iteration with a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the 
platform has undergone a major update in the past month and 0 otherwise. 
Controls. While matching “twin” apps together obviates the need for app and 
developer level controls (Foerderer and Heinzl, 2017; Kovács and Sharkey, 2014), I must 
take into account the idiosyncrasy between the “twin” apps due to platform difference. To 
control for variation in the effect of the design iteration events across different platforms, 
I included a dummy variable of platform, which is coded as 1 if the app is operating on 
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iOS platform, 0 otherwise. Further, I also included competition to control for innovation 
by competing apps across time (Turner et al., 2010). I used the number of major updates 
in the same subcategory as the focal app to measure competition (log-transformed). In 
addition, I included app age and time since the last update, and their square terms, to 
account for the influence of app lifecycle and update recency. Specifically, I measured 
app age as the log-transformed number of days since the first day of app release on the 
platform, and I measured time since last update as the log-transformed number of days 
since the date of the most recent update of the product on the same platform. Table 1.1 
shows the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of the main variables. 
Analysis 
We conducted DID regressions to estimate the adoption difference between treatment and 
control apps at the app-country-platform level, with app-country fixed effects and 
platform fixed effects. Specifically, I estimate the following fixed-effects difference-in-
differences regression: 
Yip = α + αi + αp + βTip + γtip + δ (Tip · tip) + εip 
By inspecting the equation, I can see that the coefficients have the following 
interpretation: α = constant term; αi = app-country fixed effects; αp = platform fixed 
effects; β = treatment group specific effect (treatment/control); γ = time trend common to 
control and treatment groups (pre/post-focal update); δ = true effect of treatment.  
RESULTS 
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics and the correlations between covariates. Table 1.2 
presents the results examining Hypothesis 1 in Models 1-4, which suggest that design 
iteration decreases consumers’ usage of the product. In Model 1, I only included only 
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observations that are before design iteration events (day 1 to 7 in the 15-day observation 
window), and I controlled for app, country and platform fixed effects separately. The 
coefficient of treatment suggests that treatment group has 33.4% higher DAU than the 
control group before design iteration. I interpret that there is a significant difference 
between treated and control groups regarding usage level. Developers may prefer to 
introduce a design iteration first on the platform with more active users. In Model 2, I 
only included observations that are after design iteration events (day 8 to 15 in the 15-day 
observation window). The coefficient of treatment suggests that the treatment group has 
only 16.3% higher DAU than the control group after design iteration (day 8). Compared 
with the coefficient in Model 1, the DAU gap between the treatment and control groups 
significantly shrinks, which is consistent with my H1 prediction. In Model 3, I adopted 
the classic difference-in-differences estimator to report results. The variable of interest is 
treatment*post, as the coefficient of this interaction term indicates the treatment effect of 
design iteration on the outcome variable. The coefficient of treatment*post suggests that 
apps that just experienced a design iteration event have 9.2% less DAU than before the 
design iteration event, relative to apps that do not experience design iteration events.3 
This is consistent with the results in Models 1 and 2. In Model 4, I further controlled for 
the app-country fixed effects, which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity of 
 
3 I employ the semilog specification as discussed in Greene (2003) and Wang, Aggarwal, 
& Wu (2020). When the dependent variable ln(y) is a natural log and the independent 
variable x is left unlogged, the coefficient on the (unlogged) independent variable is 
interpreted as semielasticity of that independent variable, which is the within-app percent 
change in consumer adoption. 
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consumers’ preference across different countries. The results remain consistent. Thus, my 
results support Hypothesis 1. 
Further, I examined under what conditions design iteration would be more/less 
disruptive. We, therefore, employed a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) 
design. Table 1.3 investigated the moderating effects of market position (H2), prior 
iterations (H3), and platform iteration (H4) respectively. I have predicted that the 
negative effect of design iteration on consumer adoption would be mitigated by market 
position and platform iteration and amplified by prior iterations. In Model 5, the 
coefficient of treatment*post*market position is significant. Figure 1.2 provides graphical 
illustration. For non-top 30 apps, consumer adoption decreases by 10.0% after a design 
iteration update, as compared to the control group; for top 30 apps, consumer adoption 
increases by 8.5% after a design iteration update, as compared to the control group. Thus, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2, I found that the negative effect of design iteration is 
mitigated by the market position of the game, suggesting that the benefits of design 
iteration outweigh the potential costs for market-leading games.  
Model 6 reports the coefficient of treatment*post*prior generations, and Figure 
1.3 assists in interpretation. For apps with a relatively low level of prior design iterations 
(mean – 1 SD), consumer adoption decreases by 3.5% after a design iteration, as 
compared to the control group; for apps with a high level of prior design iterations (mean 
+ 1 SD), consumer adoption decreases by 14.3% after a design iteration, as compared to 
the control group. Therefore, consistent with Hypothesis 3, I find that the negative effect 
of design iteration event is amplified by prior iterations. 
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Model 7 reports the moderating effect of platform iteration, and Figure 1.4 
facilitates the interpretation. For apps that did not experience platform iteration in the 
previous month, consumer adoption decreases by 11.5% after a design iteration, as 
compared to the control group; for apps that experienced platform iteration in the 
previous month, consumer adoption increases by 11.4% after a design iteration, as 
compared to the control group. Thus, the negative effect of design iteration event is 
mitigated by platform iteration, confirming my Hypothesis 4. In the sample, the benefits 
of design iteration turn out to outweigh the potential costs when the platform has recently 
undergone a design iteration. 
Robustness tests 
We conducted a series of robustness tests using alternative samples, measures and 
analysis techniques to verify the main findings. First, to assess whether my theoretical 
arguments only apply to design iterations rather than other types of updates, I conducted 
placebo tests based on minor updates and bugfixes. I constructed samples of minor 
updates and bugfixes using the same sample selection criteria and then reexamined my 
hypotheses. I found that minor updates or bugfixes do not exhibit significant, negative 
effects on consumer adoption.4 The coefficients of treatment*post are positive, either 
insignificant or significant. Therefore, the consumer disruption effect is only observed in 
design iterations in the sample, providing empirical support for my theoretical focus on 
 
4 Based on the update records, I excluded a small portion of mobile games that do not use 
the three-digit naming approach in order to ensure that second-digit increment updates 
are indeed minor updates. Detailed procedures to construct the sample of minor updates 
are available upon request.   
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design iterations. Second, to verify whether the negative effect of design iteration is truly 
due to disruptions to existing consumers as theorized, I created an alternative dependent 
variable that excludes those daily active users who have just downloaded the game. I did 
so by taking the difference between DAU and downloads on the focal day (log-
transformed). The results with the alternative dependent variable remain qualitatively the 
same for all hypotheses. Third, fixed effects and random effects models are both widely 
used in twin studies. While the fixed-effects model is often used in difference-in-
differences “twin” design to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, twin 
studies can also employ random-effects models (Carlin et al., 2005), which treat twin 
effects as randomly selected from a normal distribution. Accordingly, I reexamined all 
my hypotheses using random-effects models at the app-country level. The results remain 
consistent with my main specification. 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, I seek to investigate the performance outcome of design iteration. Extant 
literature has examined extensively the implications of technology evolution for firm 
competition (Tushman and Anderson, 1986), and it has emphasized the value of frequent 
iterations in sustaining competitive advantage during industry evolution (Banbury and 
Mitchell, 1995; Lawless and Anderson, 1996). My study instead examines the effect of 
design iteration on consumer adoption. This is a key dimension of innovation outcome 
since the commercial success of any innovation ultimately depends on adoption. Using a 
matched difference-in-differences design, I find that design iteration reduces adoption in 
the near-term, in line with my argument that the introduced changes are likely to cause 
disturbances by altering ingrained behavioral patterns and increasing learning costs for 
44 
 
consumers. Furthermore, consistent with the idea that the dark side of design iteration is 
conditioned by the relative benefits of adoption vis-à-vis the disruptions, I find that 
market position and platform iteration dampen the negative effect, while prior iterations 
amplify it. 
Our study makes three contributions to the literature. First, my analysis points to 
the tension in pursuing generative appropriability. Researchers advise that firms create 
new innovations that build on their own existing innovations (Ahuja et al., 2013). Studies 
indeed highlight the benefits of design iterations for sustaining competitive advantage 
during industry evolution (Banbury and Mitchell, 1995; Lawless and Anderson, 1996). 
However, while developing improved products incorporating features that build on a 
firm’s current innovation can enhance generative appropriability, an emphasis on this 
form of continual reinventiveness and seeking out new adopters could also destroy value 
for existing consumers and damage the firm’s primary appropriability, i.e. the 
commercialization of the innovation. In fact, if one views innovation as a type of 
organizational change, it seems fitting to describe it along content and process 
dimensions (Barnett and Carroll, 1995). While innovation, viewed through the lens of 
content, involves new products delivering improved technical performance and serves as 
a source of competitive advantage for innovating firms, the very process behind the 
creation of such content may incur significant disruptions to organizational routines 
partly due to the structural adjustments in the firm’s relationships with co-opetitors 
(Carroll and Teo, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 1992). I resonate with the idea of disruptive 
process effects within the organization, and I extend it to the demand side. Design 
iteration is simultaneously a value-creating outcome and a value-destroying process to 
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consumers. While the content effect of design iteration may lead to higher generative 
appropriability for the firm, the process itself incurs significant short-term costs and may 
prevent potential benefits from realization. 
Utilizing a novel identification strategy, my analysis can minimize unobserved 
heterogeneity associated with innovation behaviors and capture the causal effect of 
design iteration. While the immediate negative impact may decline over time, the 
accumulation of shocks could have profound implications for the firm’s competitiveness. 
That is particularly notable for firms in dynamic environments (e.g., the digital economy) 
where design iterations are ubiquitously used for competitive responses or to preempt 
imitation (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2018; Miric et al., 2019). One may view introducing 
design iterations as related to innovation-based firm adaptation in changing environments, 
yet extant research such as that based on NK models tends to assume a zero cost of 
adaptation for analytical clarity (Levinthal, 1997). My findings imply that adaptation 
incurs costs; put at a more abstract level, firms must first climb down the current local 
peak in order to relocate to a higher peak. I show that adaptation can trigger self-
disruption in that it erodes the customer base of incumbents and creates room for rivals’ 
competitive attack. These ideas can play a role in understanding how successful firms 
could possibly die out. On the other hand, the findings also reveal a unique challenge for 
entrepreneurial firms seeking to emerge from the low end of the market and appropriate 
generative value arising from their original innovation, given that they may find 
themselves more vulnerable to consumer backlash than market-leading incumbents.  
Second, I extend the literature on technology evolution. Prior research tends to 
link disruption with discontinuous technological transition or novel business models 
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(Henderson and Clark, 1990), not with design iteration. This is partly because the 
perceived discontinuity is assumed to be low for design iterations, given no change of 
technological regime. Moreover, research on technology evolution emphasizes that 
incumbent firms and industry structures are primarily disrupted by new entrants bringing 
about competence-destroying changes (Tushman and Anderson, 1986); yet it still begs 
the question of how successful firms get to the point where their products no longer 
appeal to consumers. I argue that, just as incumbents demonstrate inertia to technological 
changes (Rosenbloom, 2000; Tushman and Anderson, 1986), consumers may be reluctant 
to adopt design iteration because of the distortions on their ingrained behavioral patterns. 
I also stress the possibility that innovations enhancing competence for incumbents may 
unwittingly render obsolete their consumers’ accumulated skills and knowledge and 
hence destroy consumer value (Afuah, 2000; David, 1985). My view echoes but extends 
the idea that product failures arise from firms’ inability to effectively manage customer 
relationships (Levinthal, 1991).  
Lastly, I enrich the demand-side perspective on technology innovation. Since 
innovation outcomes are closely related to consumers’ adoption decisions, extant 
research examines extensively the role of the demand environment. That perspective may 
be particularly relevant for design iteration with which firms can continually adjust to 
changing demand conditions (Henderson, 1999; Lawless and Anderson, 1996). To date 
demand-side research primarily focuses on preference heterogeneity in explicating why 
certain technology innovations are adopted (Danneels, 2004). The less noted fact is that 
the vast majority of new product ideas suffer commercial failure. One of the key reasons 
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is the resistance from consumers (Claudy, Garcia, and O’Driscoll, 2015), which has been 
documented in the information systems literature (Rivard and Lapointe, 2012). 
Instilling a new dimension to the demand-side view, my study shows how and 
why the demand environment may present an impediment to product innovations. That 
impediment is attributed to the fact that consumers may be overwhelmed by the short-
term costs associated with behavioral adjustments and learning. This is similar to the 
foundational idea in the disruptive innovation literature that a technological change is 
often perceived as inferior to existing technologies by the mass of consumers (Danneels, 
2004). Moreover, the demand-side perspective allows us to explore conditions under 
which the design iteration effect varies, as consumers’ benefits of adoption may outweigh 
costs and vice versa. By focusing on important market and technology factors, I predict 
product demand as a function of the barriers that consumers face in utilizing the design 
iteration. The findings also bring nuances to the platform literature which has generally 
viewed platform iteration as a disruptive force for complementors (Kretschmer and 
Claussen, 2016; Ozalp, Cennamo, and Gawer, 2018). Overall, my analysis departs from 
the customary view of the diffusion of a fixed innovation, and instead it depicts 
consumers’ changing tendency of adoption as the product’s features and functions 
continually evolve through its lifecycle.  
The findings and the inferences from this study are subject to a number of caveats 
that offer opportunities for future research. First, my empirical analysis is based on a 
single industry setting. Whether and to what extent the findings would be observed in 
other empirical contexts remains to be seen. Second, even for multihoming apps, firms 
might have preferences for one market than the other. For instance, marketing efforts to 
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retain customers may be unevenly distributed across two platforms and potentially bias 
the results. Lastly, I encourage future research to tease out the direct, longer-term 
consequences of a design iteration while controlling for the unobserved changes in 
complementary assets and other organizational activities (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000). 
In summary, this study extends our understanding of technology evolution. It 
brings theoretical nuance to research on design iteration through a demand-side lens, and 
it enriches the view of disruption in the innovation literature. These insights shed new 
light on the risks associated with product redesign, regardless of the innovation content. 
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Table 1.1 Summary statistics and correlation 
 
  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 
1 Consumer adoption 6.621 2.454 1.000    
2 Treatment 0.527 0.499 -0.015 1.000   
3 Post 0.533 0.499 0.009 0.000 1.000  
4 Market position 0.069 0.254 0.441 -0.009 0.019 1.000 




0.096 0.294 -0.007 -0.035 -0.006 -0.089 
7 Competition 1.686 0.652 0.120 -0.017 0.100 0.122 
8 Platform 0.472 0.499 -0.096 0.112 0.000 0.023 
9 App age 6.648 0.520 0.063 -0.035 0.011 0.194 
10 
Time since the last 
update 
4.081 0.797 -0.205 0.151 0.104 -0.177 
 
  5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Consumer adoption       
2 Treatment       
3 Post       
4 Market position       




-0.066 1.000     
7 Competition 0.061 -0.173 1.000    
8 Platform -0.023 -0.217 -0.448 1.000   
9 App age 0.305 0.006 -0.080 0.163 1.000  
10 
Time since the last 
update 








Table 1.2 Influence of design iteration on consumer adoption 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-update Post-update All sample All sample 
Treatment 0.288 0.151 0.264 0.268 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Post   0.177 0.176 
   (0.021) (0.014) 
   [0.000] [0.000] 
Treatment*Post   -0.097 -0.096 
   (0.026) (0.018) 
   [0.000] [0.000] 
Market position 0.727 0.555 0.619 0.365 
 (0.066) (0.060) (0.044) (0.040) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Prior generations 0.013 -0.216 -0.058 -0.060 
 (0.070) (0.066) (0.047) (0.033) 
 [0.857] [0.001] [0.219] [0.072] 
Platform generational 
transition 
0.124 0.200 0.170 0.166 
 (0.053) (0.049) (0.035) (0.025) 
 [0.019] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Competition 0.271 0.302 0.216 0.209 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.018) (0.013) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
iOS platform -0.297 -0.323 -0.356 -0.366 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.021) (0.014) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
App age 6.839 4.564 6.271 6.290 
 (0.638) (0.642) (0.447) (0.321) 
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 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
App age2 -0.566 -0.378 -0.507 -0.508 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.033) (0.024) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Time since the last update -1.074 -1.959 -0.391 -0.332 
 (0.269) (0.376) (0.171) (0.119) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.022] [0.005] 
Time since the last update2 0.035 0.136 -0.040 -0.045 
 (0.035) (0.045) (0.023) (0.016) 
 [0.326] [0.002] [0.074] [0.004] 
App FE YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
App-country FE NO NO NO YES 
Observations 21399 24456 45855 45855 
R2 0.688 0.698 0.691 0.855 












Table 1.3 DDD-moderation effects on the relationship between design iteration and 
consumer adoption 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment*Post -0.105 0.020 -0.122 -0.031 
 (0.019) (0.039) (0.019) (0.040) 
 [0.000] [0.619] [0.000] [0.436] 
Treatment*Market position -0.434   -0.737 
 (0.057)   (0.059) 
 [0.000]   [0.000] 
Post*Market position -0.151   -0.215 
 (0.052)   (0.054) 
 [0.004]   [0.000] 
Treatment*Post*Market position 0.187   0.280 
 (0.072)   (0.074) 
 [0.009]   [0.000] 
Treatment*Prior generations  0.030  0.021 
  (0.024)  (0.025) 
  [0.216]  [0.403] 
Post*Prior generations  0.029  0.046 
  (0.022)  (0.022) 
  [0.178]  [0.041] 
Treatment*Post*Prior generations  -0.100  -0.090 
  (0.030)  (0.031) 
  [0.001]  [0.004] 
Treatment*Platform generational transition   -1.322 -1.496 
   (0.058) (0.060) 
   [0.000] [0.000] 
Post* Platform generational transition   -0.141 -0.149 
   (0.042) (0.042) 
   [0.001] [0.000] 




   (0.061) (0.061) 
   [0.000] [0.000] 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
App-country FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 45855 45855 45855 45855 
R2 0.855 0.855 0.857 0.858 















































































Pre-GPI                                                 Post-GPI
Treatment group=0 Treatment groupt=1
   
*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect 
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*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect 
High market position (ranked top 30) 
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Treatment group=0 Treatment groupt=1
 
*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect 
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Treatment group=0 Treatment group=1
 
*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect 
Apps with high number of prior iterations, mean + 1s.d.  
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*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect 
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*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect 
Apps experienced platform iteration in the previous month 




DESIGN ITERATION, INSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY, AND 
PRODUCT INNOVATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE GLOBAL MOBILE 
APPLICATION INDUSTRY 
 
Abstract: Focusing on nascent industries, this paper infuses opportunity logic with the 
institutional perspective to address the questions, how various institutional contexts shape 
firm innovation and how firms take iterative actions to navigate such institutional 
contexts. I propose that there is a U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty 
and digital product innovation, by considering both the challenges and opportunities 
firms confront in nascent industries. Furthermore, I focus on firms’ iteration of product 
design and argue that frequent iterations enable firms to better innovate under high 
institutional uncertainty. Using 4,629 firms from 54 countries in the global mobile app 
industry, my empirical results provide support for all hypotheses. I discuss implications 
for opportunity logic, a dynamic view of institutions, and the digital innovation 
phenomenon. 
 
Keywords: design iteration; institutional uncertainty; digital product innovation; nascent 




Understanding how firms innovate in nascent industries has received a significant 
upsurge of interest from strategy and entrepreneurship scholars. Particularly, the logic of 
opportunity suggests that firms must take actions of iterative search to capture the 
fleeting innovation opportunities in nascent industries (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; Ott, 
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2017; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020). While this logic has 
considerably enhanced our understanding, it largely assumes a homogeneous institutional 
context, in which nascent industries are embedded. This is not surprising, because 
nascent industries mostly emerge from advanced economies (Vernon, 1979), which tend 
to have similar institutional arrangements (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). However, with 
the ubiquity of information and communication technologies, firms around the world can 
“plug and play” in global competition to foster the emergence of nascent industries in 
different institutional contexts (Chakravorti, Tunnard, & Chaturvedi, 2015). Although it 
is well accepted that institutional variation can influence firm innovation (Shinkle & 
McCann, 2014; Zhao, 2006), little is known about how diverse institutional contexts 
associated with nascent industries may shape product innovation, and how firms should 
take iterative actions to navigate the heterogeneous landscapes.  
In addressing these questions, I investigate how various levels of institutional 
uncertainty affect firms’ product innovation. While nascent industries are characterized 
by substantial institutional uncertainty (Moeen, Agarwal, & Shah, 2020), its variation 
across countries is largely overlooked, and existing theoretical perspectives have 
contrasting implications for how different levels of institutional uncertainty may affect 
firm innovation. From opportunity logic, the more uncertain the external environment, 
60 
 
the greater the room for a firm to discover opportunities and to innovate new products 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Eisenhardt, 2002). Conversely, institutional theorists maintain 
that firms have a strong preference for a predictable institutional environment to engage 
in innovation (Peng, 2003; Xu & Meyer, 2013). When institutional environments are 
highly uncertain, firms face significant challenges to make long-term commitments like 
innovation (Banalieva, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2015). Combining these contrasting 
theoretical perspectives, I propose that there is a U-shape relationship between 
institutional uncertainty and product innovation in nascent industries.  
Moreover, I investigate how firms strategize design iteration to navigate 
institutional uncertainty and create product innovations. In particular, I focus on firms’ 
use of design iteration, a salient form of iterative search that experiments with alternative 
product designs and acquires up-to-date information from the market feedback (Chen, 
Wang, Cui, & Li, 2020; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). I argue that design iteration enables 
firms to engage in experiential learning, to sense and seize opportunities embedded in an 
uncertain and fast-changing setting. In turn, the newly created knowledge through 
iteration will help firms better develop innovative solutions to address the unmet needs in 
a particular market. Thus, I propose that firms frequently iterating product designs can 
better navigate high institutional uncertainty to create product innovations.  
 I ground my study in the mobile application industry, where firms around the 
world can develop and release mobile apps through access to global digital platforms 
such as the iOS system and Apple App Store. It has been widely recognized that mobile 
app publishers competing in this nascent industry pay tremendous attention to design 
iteration (e.g., app updates), which revamps extant product designs and collects up-to-
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date market feedback (Miric & Jeppesen, 2020; Yoo, Boland, Lyytinen, & Majchrzak, 
2012). Moreover, this nascent industry is characterized by a fast-changing, uncertain 
institutional environment, where regulations and norms regarding the use of mobile apps 
frequently shift unexpectedly (European Commission, 2014). Using a sample of 4,629 
firms from 54 countries in the mobile app industry, my empirical results provide support 
for all my hypotheses. 
This study makes several important contributions. First, I contribute to 
opportunity logic by highlighting institutional variation in nascent industries. While it is 
widely accepted that nascent industries exhibit higher institutional uncertainty compared 
to traditional businesses, I recognize that there is a huge variation of institutional contexts 
in which nascent industries are embedded. Drawing upon such institutional variation, I 
are among the first to theorize and examine how firms should contextualize their 
entrepreneurial actions, such as design iteration, to capture opportunities in different local 
contexts. Second, this study extends a dynamic view of institutions to examine the role of 
institutional uncertainty in innovation. While the institutional perspective mostly treats 
uncertainty as a challenge to overcome, I theorize that the influence of institutional 
uncertainty is twofold, in which opportunities and challenges for innovation coexist. 
Specifically, I flesh out institutional uncertainty as the unpredictable portion of 
institutional changes and find a curvilinear relationship between institutional uncertainty 
and product innovation. Third, this study also provides practical implications for digital 
innovation. It sheds light on how digital entrepreneurs can iterate to innovate, as well as 
how policy makers can better develop institutional environments to nurture digital 





Opportunity logic has received increasing attention from both strategy and 
entrepreneurship scholars (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; Ott et al., 2017). It posits that 
superior performance stems from the firm’s ability to capture attractive opportunities 
sooner, faster, and better than rivals (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2008). Attractive 
opportunities create temporary windows for firms to introduce innovative products with 
high potential for revenue and profit (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009; Shane, 2003). 
This logic is particularly relevant in nascent industries, where changes are frequent, 
unpredictable, and nonlinear (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Even small changes of 
external condition may drastically shift the business landscape (Anderson, 1999), giving 
rise to abundant flows of short-lived and unpredictable opportunities. To capture these 
opportunities, firms must engage in entrepreneurial actions, rather than building 
differentiated strategic positions or bundles of valuable resources (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 
2008). Thus, understanding how firms strategize entrepreneurial actions represents an 
important research venue of opportunity logic. 
It is widely recognized that firms take actions of iterative search to pursue 
opportunities in the market (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; Ott et al., 2017). Since firms 
in dynamic environments have difficulties thinking through the consequences of actions 
or predicting the future, they rely much less on existing knowledge and much more on 
rapidly creating situation-specific new knowledge (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Recent research finds that firms can effectively generate knowledge 
about the up-to-date market conditions by engaging in iteration-related activities (Cohen, 
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Bingham, & Hallen, 2019; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020; Ott & Eisenhardt, 2020). For 
instance, Chen et al. (2020) finds that iterating product designs enables firms to reveal, 
verify, and address latent demands of users. Opportunity logic has well explored the 
implications of design iteration. 
Insightful as opportunity logic is, it largely assumes a homogeneous institutional 
environment in which nascent industries are embedded. Traditionally, most industries 
emerged from advanced economies, as suggested by the product lifecycle theory (Vernon, 
1979). For example, the home computer industry started in US in the 1980s and gradually 
matured and migrated to other countries over two decades. Due to the advance of 
information technologies, innovation in nascent industries is no longer the privilege of 
firms in a few advanced economies, but could bloom simultaneously around the world. In 
the newly emerged mobile application industry, the presence of digital platforms (e.g., 
iOS) enables firms around the world to “plug and play” in developing mobile apps 
(Gupta & Auerswald, 2019; Sibanda & Leke, 2019). Thus, firms operating in 
heterogeneous institutional contexts across countries can partake in nascent industries 
nowadays.  
Moreover, there is increasing appreciation that the significant variation of 
institutional environments in nascent industries has important implications for innovation. 
Extant literature has long recognized that institutional differences may give rise to an 
uneven opportunity landscape and therefore shape firms’ entrepreneurial actions across 
different countries (Reuber, Knight, Liesch, & Zhou, 2018). For example, firms are found 
to take advantage of innovation opportunities presented by heterogeneous levels of 
intellectual property rights protection across countries (Zhao, 2006). Ignoring such cross-
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country variation in the theoretical background of opportunity logic would prevent us 
from understanding how firms iterate to navigate the heterogeneous landscape and how 
institutional variation shapes innovation in nascent industries. Next, I reveal important 
cross-country differences of nascent industries through an institutional perspective. 
An institutional perspective on nascent industries 
Institutional theorists have drawn on diverse strands to study how institutions matter to 
firm strategies and outcomes in nascent industries. It is widely recognized that having the 
“right” institution in place provides sufficient legitimacy, resources and incentives to 
foster innovation and further industry development (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; 
Armanios, Eesley, Li, & Eisenhardt, 2017). Scholars have strived to identify the 
favorable institutional environments that drive product innovation in nascent industries 
(Bartholomew, 1997; King et al., 1994). For example, Oxley and Yeung (2001) find that 
the cross-country variation of e-commerce development is highly dependent on the rule 
of law and availability of credible payment channels. Thus, the level of institutional 
development plays an important role in explaining firm innovation in nascent industries.  
 Recently, a burgeoning research stream goes beyond a static view to adopt a 
dynamic view of institutions. This line of research has developed concepts such as 
institutional transition (Peng, 2003), institutional fragility (Chauvet & Collier, 2004; Shi, 
Sun, Yan, & Zhu, 2017), political uncertainty (Henisz & Delios, 2001), and institutional 
change speed (Banalieva et al., 2015) to capture the heterogeneity of institutional 
dynamics across countries. Since institutions are considered the source of stability and 
order (e.g., Scott, 2001:181), a basic premise is that any changes to the institutional 
environment are considered rare and unpredictable. These studies have significantly 
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enhanced our understanding of how institutional dynamics may affect firm strategies and 
outcomes.  
While a dynamic view of institutions focuses on the likelihood and speed of 
institutional changes, it does not directly capture the extent of uncertainty in an 
institutional environment. This is an important gap, because extant literature simply 
equates uncertainty with frequent institutional changes, without recognizing that firms 
competing in turbulent markets may well predict and preempt future institutional changes 
based on past patterns. As Knight (1921) explained, “change according to a known law 
does not give rise to uncertainty.” For instance, despite the frequent changes of copyright 
laws to regulate digital content, Australia was considered to have a relatively predictable 
and stable institutional environment for digital startups. This is mostly because these 
regulatory changes were following the established precedents to reduce potential 
uncertainties (Deloitte, 2018). Hence, it is important for us to flesh out the role of 
institutional uncertainty in affecting product innovation in nascent industries.  
Institutional uncertainty in nascent industries 
The prevalence of institutional uncertainty in nascent industries is well-documented in 
extant literature. I define institutional uncertainty as the extent to which changes of an 
institutional environment do not exhibit consistent patterns. In nascent industries, the lack 
of precedents gives rise to an emerging organizational field permeated with substantial 
uncertainty (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Moeen et al., 2020). Even basic assumptions about 
how firms should be regulated have not been settled yet (Benner & Tripsas, 2012). Firms 
competing in nascent industries must deal with ill-defined legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994; Rao, 2004), regulatory ambiguities (Langlois, 2003; Marcus, 1981), and fuzzy 
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intellectual property scope (Merges & Nelson, 1994; North, 1990). Thus, institutional 
uncertainty prevails in nascent industries where institutional environment is still 
formative and unsettling.  
Although nascent industries are characterized with substantial institutional 
uncertainty, it exhibits significant variation across countries. Probing into the digital 
sector, Chakravorti et al. (2015) depicted the diverse changing trajectories of the digital-
related institutional development across 50 major countries and find that some countries 
experience significantly higher uncertainty than other countries. For example, the reform 
of the Cybersecurity laws in China made it difficult for firms to make predictions about 
the future. As the expert of China Cyber policy described: “There is an ever-shifting gray 
line”, and “it is not really clear what constitutes personal data, what should be localized 
or what the process is” (Voo, 2020). Such uncertainty raised confusion and was expected 
to make it increasingly difficult for firms to operate digital business in China (Yan, 2017). 
In comparison, Australian digital startups face less institutional uncertainty even though 
copyright laws are constantly shifting. As suggested by Chakravorti et al. (2015), the 
varying levels of institutional uncertainty across the global digital marketplace have 
important implications: firms have to innovate by customizing their approaches to this 
digital planet with various institutional uncertainty. Next, I elaborate how I investigate 
these issues in the global mobile application industry. 
EMPIRICAL GROUNDINGS AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Research context 
We study the global mobile application industry, also known as the app economy, as an 
important nascent industry with the global coverage. The revenue of mobile apps from 
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iOS and Google Play has maintained an unprecedented growing rate of 17% since its 
birth in 10 years, exceeding $83 billion in 2019 (Nelson, 2020). Due to the global reach 
of digital platforms and app stores, publishers all over the world can join and compete in 
this fast-growing sector. It is suggested that about 32.9 percent of app publishers are in 
Asia, 29.7 percent are in Europe, 29.4 percent are in North America, and the rest 7% 
come from the rest of the world (Lee, 2017). The varying countries of origin expose 
publishers to different levels of institutional uncertainty, characterized by unpredictable 
changes in regulatory and political environments, readiness of digital infrastructure, and 
acceptance of digital products/services by individuals, businesses, and governments (e.g., 
European Commission, 2014; Gupta & Auerswald, 2019; Sibanda & Leke, 2019). It 
allows us to examine how the variation of institutional uncertainty may exert implications 
on new mobile app innovations across countries.  
In addition, given the fast-changing nature of the mobile app sector, publishers 
tend to apply opportunity logic in practice, engaging in an iterative and agile approach to 
develop new products. Nowadays, over 70% publishers rely on best practices, such as 
version updates, A/B tests, gray releases, and other iteration activities to keep up with the 
changing environment (Langley, 2017). As a result, the average new mobile app 
development time is only 6 months (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017), which allow publishers 
to rapidly capture short-lived market opportunities in a dynamic environment. Thus, the 
global mobile app industry provides an ideal setting to study how publishers strategize 
with opportunity logic under varying levels of institutional uncertainty. 
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Institutional uncertainty and digital product innovation: A U-shape relationship 
Grounded in the digital context, I consider both the challenges and opportunities firms 
confront when facing varying levels of institutional uncertainty from the institutional 
perspective and opportunity logic. I argue that there is a U-shape relationship between 
institutional uncertainty and digital product innovation.  
On the one hand, the institutional perspective suggests that high level of 
institutional uncertainty could function as challenges that deter innovation, given the 
considerable difficulties to foresee future outcomes of product innovations (Henisz & 
Delios, 2001). When institutional uncertainty is high, severe concerns arise regarding 
whether the environment will change along a consistent trajectory, preventing firms from 
predicting future environmental changes (Kim, Kim, & Hoskisson, 2010; Xu & Meyer, 
2013). Such inability to predict institutional changes creates challenges associated with 
interpreting the support for a product innovation in the future (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 
2002). It is likely that the newly developed products will not be supported by future 
institutional environments, making it difficult to predict whether product innovations 
would be welcomed. Given that firms have a strong preference for predictability 
(Dimaggio & Powell, 1983), firms prefer to wait until the uncertainty is resolved. In a 
highly uncertain institutional environment where the support for digital products is 
unpredictable, firms may stall or withdraw the development of new digital products 
rather than recklessly proceed. Conversely, when institutional changes are easy to foresee, 
firms have strong confidence to preempt future institutional changes, and therefore are 
more likely to engage digital product innovation. Consequently, the challenges for firms 
to innovate digital products arise with the level of institutional uncertainty.  
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On the other hand, the logic of opportunity suggests that institutional uncertainty 
is the source of opportunities for product innovation. As noted by Eisenhardt (2002), 
“managers must jump into uncertain situations because that is where the opportunities are 
most abundant.” When institutional changes are more predictable, opportunities of 
innovation can be scarce. Digital publishers can even make adjustments or moderations 
on existing products to meet the predicable market changes, while giving little necessity 
to develop new innovations. However, when institutional uncertainty is high, there exists 
no clear clue how regulators, standard-setting bodies, and business ethics may impose 
constraints on the use of new products (Alvarez, Young, & Woolley, 2015). The lack of 
constraints blurs the boundary between the digital sector and established industries, 
creating tremendous interactions among known and unknown elements across different 
industry and social settings, as well as innovation opportunities that are previously non-
existent or unfavored (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Rindova & Courtney, 2020). As the 
number of changing factors increases, their potential interactions and associated 
innovation opportunities can escalate exponentially (Anderson, 1999; Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997). Therefore, I argue that the opportunities to develop new digital 
products exhibit a nonlinear growth pattern as institutional uncertainty increases.   
In sum, I propose that, the challenges to innovate digital products gradually 
increase with institutional uncertainty whereas the opportunities for innovation accelerate 
with institutional uncertainty in a curvilinear pattern (see Figure 2.1). The interplay 
between these innovation challenges and opportunities should result in the smooth dotted 
U-shape curve in Figure 2.1. When institutional uncertainty is relatively low, the 
increasing challenges associated with rising institutional uncertainty dominate in firms’ 
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digital innovation activities, thereby leading to a downward trend. When the level of 
institutional uncertainty is high, the opportunities emerged from unpredictable 
institutional changes escalate disproportionately and compensate for the challenges of 
innovation, inducing firms to capture them by rapidly innovating digital products. As a 
result, I propose that the likelihood that a firm innovates new digital products initially 
decreases, but then increases with institutional uncertainty.  
H1: There is a U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product 
innovation. 
Design iteration and digital product innovation in nascent industries  
Opportunity logic is a prominent theoretical lens in explaining product innovation in 
nascent industries. This logic suggests that firms competing in nascent industries can take 
actions of iterative search to develop innovative solutions for the market (Eisenhardt & 
Bingham, 2017; Ott et al., 2017). This is mostly because innovations in nascent industries 
rely much less on experience base but more on creating situation-specific new knowledge 
to find out what works in novel market contexts (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). 
Particularly, I focus on a salient form of iterative search—design iteration, through which 
firms repetitively test and tune their product designs based on market feedback. Design 
iteration is widely used in the digital sector and has profound implications on digital 
product innovation. For instance, prior research finds that frequent design iteration in the 
mobile app industry can significantly enhance the performance of mobile apps (Chen et 
al., 2020). In this study, I extend this venue and explore the implications of design 
iteration for digital product innovation.   
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We argue that frequently iterating designs of the extant digital products advances 
firms’ knowledge for developing new ones. Frequent iterations allow firms to test 
multiple variations of a specific product design and develop a broad understanding about 
viable solutions for unmet market needs. The market feedback from design iterations 
provides important cues of customer preferences and the feasibility of alternative 
technical solutions that are useful for designing new products (Thomke & Bell, 2001). By 
trying out design variations, a firm can gain an intuitive sense of the robustness of 
different design specifications and therefore generating more ideas for developing digital 
products (MacCormack, Verganti, & Iansiti, 2001).  
When firms do not frequently engage in design iterations, they need to turn to 
existing experience to develop new products (Chen et al., 2020; Eggers, 2012). In nascent 
industries like the mobile application industry, prior experiences can quickly become 
obsolete, causing risks when being overgeneralized to current conditions (Argote, 2012; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, without fast iterations, firms would neither develop an 
accurate understanding about the current market needs, nor be able to effectively 
experiment with different product designs to create solutions. Therefore, I argue that 
frequent design iterations generate valuable knowledge for firms to develop new digital 
products.   
H2: There is a positive relationship between the frequency of design iteration and digital 
product innovation. 
Interaction of institutional uncertainty and design iteration  
Following my previously-presented arguments, I expect that the institutional uncertainty 
has a curvilinear relationship with digital product innovation. While institutional 
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uncertainty plays an important role in shaping firm innovation, opportunity logic suggests 
that firms that actively engage in trial-and-error initiatives are better at capturing 
opportunities in uncertain environments (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; Ott et al., 2017). 
My study takes a granular look on firms’ iteration of product designs and attempts to 
explore how firms should strategize design iteration to navigate varying levels of 
institutional uncertainty.  
When the level of institutional uncertainty is low, institutional changes in nascent 
industries exhibit a relatively consistent changing trajectory. Under this condition, firms 
can largely predict or even preempt institutional changes while making decisions about 
future product innovations (Santangelo & Meyer, 2011). Although frequent design 
iterations may generate abundant market feedback that mostly supports firms’ projections 
about future institutional environments, such iterations and the well aligned market 
feedback would only strengthen firms’ confidence about their plans to develop new 
digital products, but add little novel elements to their knowledge base. In addition, 
considering the potential costs associated with iterations (Li et al., 2017), the benefit of 
frequent design iteration may be nominal, if not negative. On the other hand, for firms 
that do not frequently experiment with various product designs, their digital innovation 
may not necessarily be affected when institutional environments are predictable and 
stable. Under such circumstances, firms can still rely on past experiences to steer through 
potential institutional changes. Therefore, whether or not firms frequently engage in 
iteration may not be a severe issue for digital product innovation when institutional 
uncertainty is relatively low.  
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However, when institutional environment is characterized with high uncertainty, 
firms face considerable difficulties to foresee future institutional changes and the 
associated opportunities. Frequent design iterations provide a viable way for firms to 
discover and capture the opportunities to develop new digital products, allowing firms to 
probe into the uncertain future (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). Continuous testing and 
tuning of product designs help rectify firms' projections about unpredictable regulatory 
changes (McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020). Design iteration also functions as a powerful 
learning device to identify abnormal changes and uncover new opportunities. Conversely, 
if firms do not actively engage in design iteration, they could not timely scan the 
uncertain environment to identify opportunities, hindering firms from advancing their 
understanding of the fit between product designs and shifting market conditions 
(Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Therefore, they could not rapidly develop a new digital 
product when unexpected opportunities emerge. In sum, I argue frequent iterations may 
better prepare firms to probe into and capture opportunities to develop new digital 
products under a highly uncertain institutional environment, steepening the nonlinear 
trend of opportunity in Figure 2.1.  
H3: The U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product 
innovation is positively moderated by the frequency of design iteration, making the 
curvilinear relationship steeper in the end of high institutional uncertainty. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data and sample selection  
To test my hypotheses, I utilize a sample of mobile app publishers with international 
coverage. I obtain the data from Apptopia, a leading analyst firm in the mobile 
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application industry, which tracks the data of Apple App Stores in 58 major country 
markets. This dataset archives comprehensive information about mobile app 
characteristics for the period from January 1st, 2015 to December 31st, 2017, including 
important variables like release dates, categories, descriptions, and in-app purchases, as 
well as information on publishers’ product portfolios, their downloads and revenue, 
headquarter location, etc. To supplement this data, I also obtain the Networked Readiness 
Index data from the World Economic Forums, which captures the institutional conditions 
of 139 countries in utilizing information and communication technologies. These datasets 
together allow us to investigate and compare the influence of institutions on the 
innovation activities of mobile app publishers across countries.    
Following prior studies using mobile app datasets (Ghose & Han, 2014; Kapoor 
& Agarwal, 2017; Chen et al., 2020), I employ a “top segmentation” approach to 
construct my research sample. Kapoor and Agarwal (2017) argue that the top 
segmentation approach provides an ideal sampling procedure because the distribution of 
publisher revenue and downloads is heavily skewed, and the total number of publishers is 
enormous. As an indication of this distribution, over half (55%) of mobile app revenue is 
generated by the top 100 publishers, with the rest taken up by the other 1,500,000 
publishers (Pollen VC Report, 2015). Adopting a random sampling approach with this 
dataset runs the risk of including a multitude of amateur publishers (Boudreau & 
Jeppesen, 2015), who do not put much emphasis on innovation and profitability. Thus, 
the “top segmentation” approach is suitable for us to identify publishers who are actively 
engaged in innovation. For the sample, I select publishers that have developed apps 
ranked top 1000 in the iOS overall category during January 2015 to December 2017 in 
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any market. Then I keep those publishers that have detailed information about all the key 
variables. This process leads to a final sample of 4,629 publishers headquartered in 54 
countries.  
Measures 
Dependent variable. Digital product innovation. I conceptualized innovation as 
firms’ implementation of novel ideas to fulfill specific market needs by introducing new 
products, in line with previous innovation studies (Damanpour, 1987; Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995). In the digital sector, product innovation involves implementing 
incumbent digital technologies to serve newly emerged product markets, rather than 
creating new-to-the-market technological solutions. I used the publisher-year count of 
new mobile app introductions by the focal publisher. For example, although Didi is not 
the first to introduce the car-sharing service, the fact that it has successfully implemented 
the car-sharing idea and technologies in the Chinese market qualifies it as a digital 
product innovation in my definition. Similar operationalizations are also used in recent 
studies focusing on the mobile app industry (e.g., Miric & Jeppesen, 2020). Thus, my 
study focuses on how institutional uncertainty affects app publishers’ efforts to pursue 
market opportunities with new products. 
Independent variables. Institutional uncertainty. To measure institutional 
uncertainty, I focus on the laws related to the information and communications 
technology (ICT) industries, such as the e-commerce laws, consumer privacy protection, 
cybersecurity laws, copyright laws, etc. These regulations specify the legal arrangements 
regarding what should or should not be done when doing business in the digital sector. 
World Economic Forum (WEF) surveys executives all over the world to assess the 
76 
 
development level of their countries’ laws relating to the use of ICTs. Moreover, WEF 
constructs a comprehensive dataset, named the Networked Readiness Index, which 
broadly assesses the extent to which a country’s political, legal and economic framework 
supports the development of ICT related industries in each year from 2012 to 2016. ICT 
related laws share a high correlation (coeff. > 0.9) with the composite numbers of the 
Networked Readiness Index, indicating that ICT related laws generally reflect the 
variation of the overall digital institutional environment. To illustrate the robustness of 
my results, I also conduct additional tests using the Network Readiness Index as an 
alternative measure. 
From this foundation, I then develop a measure for institutional uncertainty. I seek 
to find out how much of the variation in ICT laws can be explained by historical data, 
based on the changing trajectories of the ICT related laws in the past three years. I follow 
Wholey and Brittain (1989) and define a measure of uncertainty based on the explanatory 
power of historical data (Claussen et al., 2018). I run a regression for each country in 
each year, in which I regress a linear time trend on the ICT laws. The R2 of this 
regression represents the part of the ICT laws variation that can be explained by an 
overall time trend. Accordingly, the 1- R2 is the percentage of the unpredictable variation 
of ICT laws. This definition allows us to empirically distinguish between countries with 
different levels of uncertainty. Higher values of uncertainty mean the country is 
experiencing changes in the digital-related institutional environment that are difficult to 
anticipate based on historical data.   
Design iteration. Like any software, mobile apps are technologically flexible and 
are open to post-introduction adjustments (Nambisan et al., 2017). In the Apple App 
77 
 
Store, after launching a new app, publishers regularly release app updates to refine design 
specifications and/or add novel features in response to new problems raised by existing 
users. Each update can be downloaded and installed as a new version of the original app. 
Information systems research has used updates to examine software evolution (Tiwana, 
2015). In the mobile app industry, publishers are following the semantic versioning 
standard, which is based on three digits (i.e., Version 1.2.0, 3.7.2), to release new updates. 
Typically, an increment in the first digit means significant improvements or changes in 
interface, features and functionality; an increment in the second digit reflects relatively 
minor feature changes and/or additions; and an increment in the third digit implies 
marginal changes or bug fixes (Chen et al., 2020). Thus, in order to distinguish design 
iterations from bug-fixing releases, I use the monthly-average of changes in the first and 
second digit of given publishers’ mobile apps in the focal year as the proxy of the 
frequency of design iterations.  
Control variables. I also identify a set of controls that can potentially affect the 
innovation behavior of mobile app publishers, and I categorize these controls according 
to publisher and country attributes. At the publisher level, I control for the influence of 
product diversification and international diversification on innovation (Hitt, Hoskisson, & 
Kim, 1997). I construct the inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), represented as 1 
– ∑(Pi2), where p is the percentage of downloads for each category i. To measure 
international diversification, I use the HHI based on downloads for the measure of 
international diversification (Hitt et al., 1997; Kistruck et al., 2013). I use the number of 
apps released by the publisher as a measure of portfolio size (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). I 
also use the average app file size to capture publisher technological sophistication 
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(Ghose & Han, 2014). Moreover, to account for the influence of installed base on 
innovation, I include the number of downloads for publishers’ mobile apps (Schilling, 
2002). At the country level, I follow previous research on institutional dynamics 
(Banalieva et al., 2015) to control for the speed of institutional change and the level of 
institutional development to ensure that I isolate the effect of uncertainty from other 
characteristics of the institutional environment. The speed measure is the coefficient in 
the time trend regression when constructing the uncertainty measure; the level of 
institutional development is the development level of ICT related laws. To avoid 
potential simultaneity confounds, all independent and control variables are lagged by one 
year. 
Analysis 
Our dependent variable is a highly skewed count measure, and its variance exceeds its 
mean. I thus use a negative binomial model to fit the count data with overdispersion. 
Furthermore, because there are multiple observations for each publisher in the data, I 
employ panel count models to account for the nonindependence of these observations. 
Following previous studies with similar data structures (e.g., Zelner et al., 2009), I 
employ the population-averaged rather than fixed effects (FE) estimators for several 
reasons. First, using fixed-effects models may have forcefully dropped publisher samples 
that do not introduce any new games throughout the observation window. Second, fixed-
effects models also neglect between-publisher variation, which is a key focus of this 
paper in comparing publishers with different gamer bases. Therefore, I estimate a 




Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation metrics. The correlation table 
suggests that bivariate correlations are unlikely to be a concern, given that all are smaller 
than 0.37 (Kennedy, 2003). In addition, I calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) in 
all models, including all the interaction terms. The average VIF is 1.25, which is below 
the threshold level of 5 (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990).  
In Model 1 of Table 2, I only include control variables. In Model 2, I include 
institutional uncertainty and its squared term. The positive and significant coefficient 
(coeff. = 0.428, p = 0.004) for the squared term of institutional uncertainty supports H1, 
indicating a U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product 
innovation. This highlights that digital product innovations are prompted when the 
institutional environment changes in a highly predictable or unpredictable way. To test 
Hypothesis 2, I add design iteration in Model 3. The results illustrate that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between design iteration and digital product 
innovation (coeff. = 0.479, p =0.000). It suggests that with one more design iteration 
every month, the likelihood of introducing a digital product innovation increases by 
61.4%. Thus, H2 is well supported.  
To test Hypothesis 3, in Model 4, I find that the interaction between the squared 
term of institutional uncertainty and design iteration is positive and statistically 
significant (coeff. = 1.261, p =0.044 in Model 4). Given that I use the negative binomial 
model as a typical nonlinear specification, I implement the recommended procedures by 
Kotha, Zheng, & George (2011). I find that the slopes at the 99th percentile of 
institutional uncertainty steepen as the level of frequency increases. In addition, to further 
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interpret whether the U-shape moderation effect concerns the shift of the turning point, I 
use the Stata code nlcom to test whether the derivative of the turning point is indeed 
significantly different from zero (Haans et al., 2016). The results show that the turning 
point does not change significantly while the slope of the U-shape, especially on the high 
uncertainty side, becomes steeper.  
Figure 2 provides visual supports to further interpret the results in Model 4 
(Criscuolo, Dahlander, Grohsjean, & Salter, 2017). Figure 3 presents the predicted 
number of digital product innovation across different levels of moderators, where the 
high level of design iteration is mean + 1 S. D., and the low level of design iteration is 
mean – 1 S. D. It shows that high design iteration frequency makes the U-shape curve 
steeper, especially when institutional uncertainty is high. Put differently, in a highly 
uncertain institutional environment, the number of digital product innovations created by 
firms with high design iteration frequency is significantly higher than that of firms with 
low design iteration frequency. These findings coincide with my theoretical arguments 
that frequent design iterations enable firms to create more product innovation when 
institutional uncertainty is high. 
Robustness tests 
We conduct several sets of sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of my findings. 
First, while my focus on the ICT related laws captures the critical aspect of digital-related 
institutional environments, I also conduct robustness tests to illustrate that my results still 
hold when I adopt a comprehensive index. I reconstruct institutional uncertainty based on 
the composite score of the Network Readiness Index, which broadly accounts for 
regulatory and political environments, readiness of digital infrastructure, and acceptance 
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of digital products/services by individuals, businesses, and governments. I reexamine all 
my hypotheses using this measurement, and the results in Table 2.3 suggest that all 
hypotheses are well supported.  
 Second, I also assess whether reverse causality can be a concern in my research 
context. While I have followed a mainstream approach and lagged all the predicting 
variables by one year, I also reverse the independent and dependent variables to test the 
possibility of reverse causality (Li et al., 2018). Specifically, I consider firm’s digital 
product innovations in year t – 1 as the focal independent variable, and institutional 
uncertainty in year t as the dependent variable. I do not find a significant main effect in 
this direction. This suggests that reverse causality is less likely to be a concern in my 
research context. However, I also admit the possibility of reverse causality in considering 
study limitations, as the interplay between institutional changes and actors’ movement 
can be a potential issue.  
Third, I include national cultures as control variables. Prior entrepreneurship 
literature suggests that national cultural dimensions like uncertainty avoidance may 
directly affect entrepreneurs’ perceptions of institutional uncertainty (McMullen & 
Shepherd, 2006). I include four well-recognized cultural dimensions as control variables: 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and feminism. My main effect still 
receives relatively strong support with p values smaller than 0.1.  
Fourth, I mitigate the concern that my results may be affected by the institutional 
environment of foreign markets. I include a new control – the ratio of total downloads 
from foreign markets – into my regression models. I replicate all analyses and the results 
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well support all my hypotheses, indicating that my finding is not biased by firms’ 
exposure to the institutional environments of foreign markets.  
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, I explore how varying levels of institutional uncertainty across countries 
shape firm innovation in nascent industries and how firms strategize design iteration to 
navigate institutional uncertainty. By infusing opportunity logic with the institutional 
perspective, I argue that institutional uncertainty has a curvilinear impact, i.e., U-shape, 
on product innovation, and that this effect is moderated by firms’ design iteration. Based 
on the empirical investigation of new mobile app releases in a sample of 4,629 firms from 
54 countries, I find that firms are most likely to introduce digital product innovations 
when institutional uncertainty is extremely low or high. I further find that frequent design 
iterations enable firms to capture the underlying opportunities to create digital product 
innovation in a given country when the country’s institutional uncertainty is high. Thus, 
my empirical results provide support for all hypotheses. This study offers important 
contributions to opportunity logic, a dynamic view of institutions, and the phenomenon of 
digital innovation.  
First, I contribute to opportunity logic by highlighting institutional variation in 
nascent industries. Opportunity logic is theoretically intriguing because it pushes beyond 
the boundary conditions of traditional strategic logics (e.g., position, leverage). While 
traditional logics suggest that firms sustain competitive advantages through differential 
positioning or valuable resources, opportunity logic focuses on the fast-changing, 
uncertain settings, such as nascent industries, where resources and positions could be 
quickly rendered obsolete (D’Aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010). While this particular 
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focus helps unveil how firms engage in iteration-related activities to capture fleeting 
opportunities in nascent industries (Ott et al., 2017), it also assumes a level playing field 
in nascent industries. In other words, opportunity logic largely presupposes a 
homogeneously uncertain and fast-changing environment in the background, which 
neglects the significant institutional variation.  
I am among the first to theorize and examine the role of institutional context in 
opportunity logic. Given the importance of the integration between traditional strategic 
logics and the institutional perspective (Peng et al., 2008), I see it as an important 
initiative to channel this emerging strategic logic with the wisdom of institutional 
theorists. I recognize that various institutional contexts may shape opportunity landscapes 
in different ways (North, 1990), requiring firms to strategize differently to capture 
opportunities. Specifically, I examine how firms should contextualize their design 
iteration strategies to pursue innovation opportunities under different levels of 
institutional uncertainty. I find that firms should frequently iterate product designs when 
they are embedded in a country with high institutional uncertainty, because intensive 
search efforts keep firms updated about the new situation-specific knowledge, which is 
necessary to probe into and capture opportunities in an uncertain environment. On the 
other hand, when institutional context is less uncertain, firms can better predict and 
preempt future institutional changes so that there is relatively less need to expend efforts 
on design iteration.  
This finding reveals that learning and innovation processes are shaped by the 
institutional context (Levinthal, 2020). Particularly, firms should pay strong attention to 
how they arrange learning processes to navigate the constantly shifting business 
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landscape in nascent industries. While this study highlights the frequency of design 
iteration, future studies could explore the temporal dimensions of a wide array of learning 
processes (e.g., trial-and-error learning, improvisation, experimentation). For example, 
Brown & Eisenhardt (1997) have noted that high-tech firms tend to use rhythms to 
arrange their product experimentations. To date, I still know very little about their 
implications. Furthermore, I call for future research on opportunity logic to direct more 
attention to the role of other institutional arrangements. Previous research suggests that 
regulations, such as bankruptcy laws, contribute to a favorable institutional environment 
that encourages entrepreneurial actions (Lee, Peng, & Barney, 2007; Reuber et al., 2018). 
To date, I still lack understanding on what institutional contexts prompt firms to better 
capture opportunities in this turbulent age. Moreover, as it is increasingly convenient for 
firms to tap into foreign markets, it is worth exploring a “born global” perspective to 
understand how opportunities scattered across different countries may simultaneously 
exert significant influence on innovation (Knight & Liesch, 2016). While my study 
focuses on the influence of the domestic institutional environment by controlling for 
firm’s level of international diversification, I encourage future research to explore how 
firms seize the heterogeneous opportunities across different institutional contexts. In sum, 
I think these are exciting venues to pursue. Theoretically, it encourages us to further 
develop opportunity logic and incorporate perspectives from international business 
research to address these complex questions. Practically, the findings could also inform 
latest practices about how high-tech startups should configure business models to create 
and capture value across countries.  
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Second, this study extends a dynamic view of institutions by theorizing the role of 
institutional uncertainty. A dynamic institution-based view is of critical importance to 
understand how institutional dynamics shape firm’s decision-making (Banalieva et al., 
2015). This burgeoning view has a strong focus on how institutional environments 
change over time, instead of the traditional emphasis on the development level of 
institutions. Extant literature has shown that a shifting institutional environment induces 
significant uncertainty that deters firms from making long-term investments (Banalieva et 
al., 2015; Chen, Cui, Li, & Rolfe, 2017; Kim et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2017). However, in 
nascent industries, the institutional environment is constantly changing, and firms are 
accustomed to the occurrences of institutional changes (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009). Furthermore, firms may well predict and preempt future institutional 
changes to introduce new products (Tolbert, David, & Sine, 2011). In other words, a 
shifting institutional environment does not necessarily incur uncertainty.  
In addressing this gap, I capture institutional uncertainty by focusing on the 
inconsistent patterns of institutional changes. By doing so, I extend a dynamic view of 
institutions in recognizing that institutional changes could be well preempted if they 
follow previous changing trajectories. It is an important extension as it departs from the 
conventional wisdom that institutions are relatively stable over a long period of time and 
helps create new insights that treat institutional dynamics as the norm. Moreover, I 
complement the institutional perspective by emphasizing that institutional uncertainty not 
only induces challenges but creates opportunities for innovation. This theoretical insight 
depicts a comprehensive picture of how firms make decisions under uncertainty. While 
institutional uncertainty may force firms to adopt a “wait and see” approach (e.g., 
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Banalieva et al., 2015; Henisz & Delios, 2001), it could also encourage firms to “grab” 
the opportunities (Rindova & Courtney, 2020). I uncover a U-shape relationship between 
institutional uncertainty and digital product innovation. I argue that low institutional 
uncertainty reduces the costs of interpreting the appropriateness of a product innovation 
in the future, while high institutional uncertainty gives rise to new market niches where 
opportunities emerge for developing products or services. Meanwhile, firms that stay in a 
moderate level of institutional uncertainty bear the full brunt of the costs and have fewer 
incentives to develop new products.  
Third, my study offers timely insights to the digital innovation phenomenon for 
policy makers and managers. I identify the favorable institutional conditions at the 
country level that foster digital innovation. While extant literature mostly studies the 
influence of institutional development (Bartholomew, 1997; King et al., 1994; Oxley & 
Yeung, 2001), I find that the dynamics of institutional environments play an important 
role in explaining firm innovation. This has important implications in the global digital 
transformation. As I are currently situated in the flux of diverse digital regulatory 
standards, countries, whether developed or developing ones, are actively experimenting 
and shifting among these alternative digital-related institutions to find what works for 
them. The induced institutional dynamics throughout this experimentation process may 
significantly influence digital innovation and determine the competitiveness of countries 
in the digital sector. Thus, my study directs more attention from the level of institutional 
development to the changing trajectory of these institutions.  
Furthermore, my focus on design iteration may inform practices about how 
entrepreneurs should manage digital innovation. Recently, there is a heated, ongoing 
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discussion among entrepreneurs regarding agile development and lean startup, both of 
which emphasize the importance of iteration-related activities to digital product 
development (Levinthal & Contigiani, 2019). However, iteration is not the panacea for 
innovation. It is reported to incur considerable financial costs and employee stress (Li et 
al., 2017; Schreier, 2017). Thus, entrepreneurs pay substantial attention to how they 
should schedule each round of iteration so that they could develop innovative products 
with high efficiency and low costs. I highlight that an important factor to consider is the 
institutional contexts in which they are embedded. The benefit of design iteration in 
countries characterized with relatively low uncertainty may not be comparative to 
iterating under high institutional uncertainty. Therefore, my findings offer valuable 
insights for firms to customize their arrangement of iteration activities in or across 
different country markets.    
I also acknowledge that my theorization in this study has important limitations in 
terms of generalizability. An assumption of a high-velocity market, such as nascent 
industries, underlies the use of opportunity logic (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2008). 
Attractive flows of opportunities may result in superior performance in this context 
because valuable resources and differential positions are short-lived and can be quickly 
rendered obsolete. Thus, my theoretical arguments can be well applied to industrial 
environments that are characterized by unpredictable and rapid changes. In relatively 
stable markets, iteration may still enable firms to learn but should be considered less 
effective. Moreover, my focus on the digital sector assumes a highly flexible and agile 
product development process, which greatly enhances firms' capability to capture fleeting 
opportunities. For example, new mobile app development takes six months on average 
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(Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). In nascent industries where product development takes much 
longer (e.g., biotech), the U-shape curve of the relationship between institutional 
uncertainty and innovation may be less likely to be observed because the emerged 
opportunities are difficult to capture before they become outdated. Nevertheless, with the 
strong momentum of digitalization, I expect that the product development processes 
would be transformed in many industries, enabling more firms to capture opportunities 
rapidly. 
Given that this study is among the first to investigate how firms iterate under 
uncertain institutional environments, the findings and inferences from the study are also 
subject to a number of empirical caveats that suggest opportunities for future research. As 
my research context focuses on the nascent phenomenon of digital product innovation, 
data availability at the firm level is a major concern. For example, the iOS platform 
mostly collects app-level information, which may constrain my ability to provide a 
complete data series for firms’ characteristics (e.g., ownership, R&D spending). Despite 
my efforts to construct firm level proxies like portfolio size, technical sophistication, and 
installed base to control for important firm attributes in this setting, I hope that future 
studies may incorporate more fine-grained firm level variables to account for firm 
dynamics. 
In addition, while I have identified the home country of each mobile app publisher, 
I do not have detailed information on the location of product development. Therefore, I 
could not rule out the possibility that product development may be conducted outside the 
home country. It is less of a concern in the mobile app industry, as most publishers are 
startups that could not afford to set up subsidiaries in foreign countries. Moreover, my 
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focus on the iOS platform may also lead to selection issues and could not account for 
platform diversification strategies. Although I have controlled for iOS market share in 
each country to reduce this concern, future studies may integrate observations from both 
iOS and Android to construct a comprehensive dataset.  
CONCLUSION 
Grounded in nascent industries, this paper explores which institutional contexts create 
opportunities for firm innovation and how firms take iterative actions to pursue these 
opportunities. I infuse opportunity logic with institutional perspective and find that there 
is a U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product innovation. 
This study also sheds light on the role of design iteration in facilitating firms’ capture of 
innovation opportunities under high institutional uncertainty. Thus, this study contributes 
to the development of opportunity logic, extends a dynamic view of institutions, and 





Table 2.1 Summary statistics and correlation table 
  
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Digital product innovation 1.00 
    
2 Institutional uncertainty 0.01 1.00 
   
3 Design iteration -0.01 0.00 1.00 
  
4 Level of institutional development 0.00 0.21 0.04 1.00 
 
5 Speed of institutional change 0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.06 1.00 
6 International diversification -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.07 0.13 
7 Product diversification 0.05 -0.03 -0.15 -0.03 -0.09 
8 Portfolio size 0.07 0.01 0.21 0.07 -0.03 
9 Firm technological sophistication 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.03 -0.01 
10 Installed base 0.20 -0.01 -0.22 0.03 -0.06 
 MEAN 4.17 0.41 0.37 4.97 -0.03 
 S.D. 31.41 0.23 0.39 0.52 0.09 
 
 Variables 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Digital product innovation 
     
2 Institutional uncertainty 
     
3 Design iteration 
     
4 Level of institutional development 
 
 
   
5 Speed of institutional change 
 
 
   
6 International diversification 1.00 
    
7 Product diversification 0.00 1.00 
   
8 Portfolio size -0.25 -0.01 1.00   
9 Firm technological sophistication -0.06 -0.30 0.24 1.00 
 
10 Installed base -0.03 0.37 0.33 -0.06 1.00 
 MEAN 0.78 0.30 7.27 17.20 2.53 
 S.D. 0.22 0.29 2.01 1.15 1.25 
Note: Absolute correlations greater or equal to 0.02 are significant at p<0.05. 
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Table 2.2 The relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product 
innovation 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Institutional uncertainty (H1)  -0.379* -0.400** 0.030 
   (0.148) (0.148) (0.295) 
   [0.010] [0.007] [0.918] 
Institutional uncertainty2   0.428** 0.445** -0.067 
   (0.147) (0.147) (0.292) 
   [0.004] [0.003] [0.817] 
Design iteration (H2)   0.479*** 0.509*** 
    (0.057) (0.092) 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
Institutional uncertainty * 
Design iteration 
 
    -1.056 
    (0.635) 
     [0.096] 
Institutional uncertainty2 * 
Design iteration 
   
(H3)    1.261* 
    (0.627) 
     [0.044] 
Level of institutional 
development 
 -0.026 -0.031 -0.030 -0.031 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
  [0.293] [0.207] [0.221] [0.215] 
Speed of institutional change  -0.017 -0.077 -0.072 -0.064 
  (0.132) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) 
  [0.895] [0.571] [0.596] [0.634] 
International diversification  -0.009 -0.021 0.008 0.008 
  (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
  [0.883] [0.725] [0.899] [0.898] 
Product diversification  0.401*** 0.399*** 0.386*** 0.390*** 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Portfolio size  0.062*** 0.062*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Firm technological 
sophistication 
 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Installed base  0.704*** 0.704*** 0.725*** 0.726*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  11968 11968 11968 11968 
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Standard errors are included in parentheses. P-values are in square brackets, ***<0.001; 















































Table 2.3 The relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product 
innovation 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Institutional uncertainty (H1)  -0.500*** -0.493** 0.199 
   (0.150) (0.150) (0.300) 
   [0.001] [0.001] [0.507] 
Institutional uncertainty2   0.416** 0.420** -0.368 
   (0.161) (0.161) (0.320) 
   [0.010] [0.009] [0.251] 
Design iteration (H2)   0.451*** 0.573*** 
    (0.058) (0.082) 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
Institutional uncertainty * Design 
iteration 
 
    -1.714** 
    (0.647) 
     [0.008] 
Institutional uncertainty2 * 
Design iteration 
   
(H3)    1.959** 
    (0.698) 
     [0.005] 
Level of institutional 
development 
 -0.059** -0.066** -0.067** -0.065** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
  [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
Speed of institutional change  0.075 -0.155 -0.194 -0.207 
  (0.248) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) 
  [0.762] [0.557] [0.464] [0.433] 
International diversification  -0.014 -0.025 0.002 0.000 
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
  [0.813] [0.683] [0.970] [0.998] 
Product diversification  0.457*** 0.454*** 0.442*** 0.445*** 
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Portfolio size  0.070*** 0.070*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Firm technological sophistication  0.171*** 0.170*** 0.163*** 0.163*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Installed base  0.700*** 0.699*** 0.718*** 0.718*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  11968 11968 11968 11968 
Standard errors are included in parentheses. P-values are in square brackets, ***<0.001; 
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Figure 2.2 The moderation effect of design iteration frequency on the relationship 









LIKE CLOCKWORK? DESIGN ITERATION RHYTHMS AND THE 
DIVERSIFICATION OF DIGITAL STARTUPS 
 
Abstract: Design iteration is an important, yet understudied, topic for understanding how 
digital startups compete in evolving and diverse market conditions. While extant 
literature has indicated the benefits of rhythms in organizing strategic activities in 
established firms, little consideration has been given to whether and under what 
conditions digital startups utilize rhythms to organize design iterations. Based on a 
sample of 110 digital startups in the global mobile game industry, I find that digital 
startups tend to use rhythms for design iterations. Moreover, different types of market 
diversification exert opposing influences on the enactment of design iteration rhythms. 
This study contributes to current understanding of design iterations and to strategic 
rhythms research. 
 





Design iterations, which repetitively revamp product designs, are of critical importance in 
today’s business landscape. This is particularly true for digital startups, many of which 
rely on iterations of the initial product to keep up with shifting market conditions. For 
instance, in its early stages, Google iteratively revamped its search engine to 
accommodate the evolving needs of advertisers and search users, enabling it to surpass a 
$1 billion revenue milestone within 48 months of its establishment (Docherty, 2019; 
Statista, 2019). Design iterations are widely used by digital startups, and it is suggested 
that these iterations account for the vast majority of economic value created by these 
startups (Langley, 2017; Saleh, 2017). In turn, scholars and practitioners have been 
seeking to understand how digital startups manage product development (Nambisan et al., 
2017), particularly design iterations.  
Extant literature has offered divergent theoretical insights that can be used to 
consider this issue. On the one hand, it is suggested that product development needs to be 
rolled out promptly, in order to make product offerings stay relevant and innovative 
(Iansiti & MacCormack, 1997; MacCormack et al., 2001). For digital startups, this 
approach aligns with their capacity for being agile and responsive (Childers, 2019). On 
the other hand, scholars have noted that firms develop new products with rhythms, 
maintaining regular time intervals between product development. Using rhythms is 
suggested to help facilitate coordination and enable firms to be more focused (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997). By extension, digital startups may regularly introduce design iterations, 
and exhibit consistent time intervals in introducing them. Some very successful digital 
startups (e.g., SpaceApe) have attributed their extreme growth to the use of rhythm-
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related business practices (Batchelor, 2017; Gupta & Rood, 2012), and have strongly 
encouraged the approach of fixed time intervals for each cycle of design iteration. These 
conflicting arguments and observations from practice raise considerable questions 
regarding how digital startups organize design iterations -- with rhythms or not. 
Moreover, few studies have empirically investigated this issue.  
To address this gap, I examine whether digital startups use rhythms for design 
iterations. Rhythms have become an increasingly important temporal lens for examining 
the strategic activities of firms. Extant literature suggests that established firms are 
incentivized to use stable temporal structures like rhythms across a wide range of 
strategic activities, including innovation, internationalization, acquisition, and strategic 
change (Ahuja et al., 2013; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Klarner & Raisch, 2013; 
Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Turner et al., 2013; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Yet, the 
literature has provided little insight or evidence as to why and whether startups might also 
utilize rhythms, which is salient as agile responses to changes are often viewed as a 
central element of strategy for startups (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Zahra & Garvis, 
2000). In this paper, I propose that even digital startups tend to develop regular rhythms 
for their design iteration activities. I draw on a coordination logic (Becker, 2004; Nelson 
& Winter, 1982) to argue that digital startups seek to diminish the difficulties in internal 
coordination and therefore develop rhythms to organize design iterations. In other words, 
the considerable opportunities for coordination efficiencies in design iteration drive these 
firms to develop rhythms.  
Further, I examine the boundary conditions of using design iteration rhythms, i.e., 
the conditions under which digital startups prefer to employ regular rhythms rather than 
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rapidly respond to market changes. Specifically, I investigate how competing in diverse 
markets may influence digital startups’ adherence to rhythmic design iterations. This is 
important because market diversification is not uncommon for digital startups, given their 
convenient access to multiple markets through digital affordances, e.g., iOS app store 
(Shaheer & Li, 2020; Tanriverdi̇ & Lee, 2008). Diversification requires startups to 
simultaneously accommodate evolving conditions in heterogenous markets, imposing 
considerable challenges on internal coordination and market responsiveness (Eisenhardt 
et al., 2010). Yet, I know little about how startups arrange their design iteration rhythms 
to address these challenges. In this paper, I propose that two types of market 
diversification, platform diversification and international diversification, affect digital 
startups’ adherence to design iteration rhythms. I argue that these types of market 
diversification exert opposing influences on design iteration rhythms, given the distinct 
challenges in these diverse markets.  
This paper empirically examines the presence of design iteration rhythms in the 
mobile game industry. The mobile game sector is characterized by diverse and frequently 
evolving conditions regarding regulations, technologies, consumer demand and 
competition, thereby providing an ideal context to study design iterations. In particular, 
game updates represent the dominant form of design iterations in this context. Mobile 
game publishers rely heavily on game updates to redesign gameplay, release new product 
content, and generate improved game designs based on market feedback (Ascarza et al., 
2019). It is suggested that more than 60% of total revenues are generated through 
continuous updates, rather than upfront payment, and over 50% of total expenses are 
attributed to updates (Li et al., 2017; Saleh, 2017). Moreover, given the nascency of this 
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sector, young startups play an important role in developing the mobile game industry.  I 
examine my hypotheses with a sample of 110 mobile game startups and find evidence in 
support of my hypotheses. In doing so, my study contributes to current understanding of 
design iterations and strategic rhythms literature. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Design iterations 
A conventional view of product development encompasses meticulous upfront planning 
to translate product concepts to design specifications and then to final products (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995). However, this approach can face considerable challenges in an 
uncertain technological environment like the digital sector. This is because the outcome 
of traditional product development may become obsolete by the time of product launch 
(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989), suggesting incentive for a more 
flexible approach. And in order to deal with fast external changes in the digital era, firms 
may adopt a more flexible and agile approach when developing new products (Iansiti & 
MacCormack, 1997; MacCormack et al., 2001). With design iterations, firms can flexibly 
revamp product designs (Chen et al., 2020; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Specifically, 
design iterations enable them to adapt to up-to-date market conditions and enhance the 
value of product innovations (Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2017). Thus, design iterations 
need to be rolled out in time to keep up with the market changes (e.g., shifts in consumer 
tastes, competitor moves, technological events). A typical form of design iterations in the 
digital sector is generational updates of software. Updates allow software companies to 
flexibly adjust and test product designs within their current user base or selective 
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customer groups (Tiwana, 2015), thereby learning about consumer demand and 
technological shifts.  
To illustrate how iteration works within my empirical context, I elaborate on 
game update introductions by publishers of mobile games. Game updates often consist of 
new game content or features (e.g., new maps, champions, weapons, or skins), limited 
time events (e.g., New Year sale), and changes of game designs. A common approach for 
mobile game publishers is to first collect user feedback on their extant game design and 
then analyze whether users’ interactions with the game design is consistent with 
publishers’ expectations, followed by generating up-to-date understanding about users’ 
status, and then strategically changing game designs and releasing new content to keep 
users excited (Rayport et al., 2017). In particular, sticking to regular rhythms has been 
suggested as a key strategy to organize iteration activities. Some very successful mobile 
game startups have revealed that they intentionally release updates at a consistent rate, 
e.g., weekly or monthly, and have attributed their success to these regular updates 
(Batchelor, 2017; Gupta & Rood, 2012). To better understand rhythms for design 
iteration, I next consider the strategy research on rhythms more generally. 
Rhythms and strategic activities 
Rhythms are so common that their strategic benefits are easy to overlook. Firms 
intentionally enact temporal structure to manage a series of actions over time for the 
purpose of achieving strategic goals (Ancona & Chong, 1996; Kunisch et al., 2017). 
Arguably, most scholarly attention has been devoted to regular rhythms5, which exhibit 
 
5 Terms like temporal consistency (Turner et al., 2013) and temporal dispersion (Wang 
and Zatzick, 2019) are also used.  
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consistent time intervals between strategic activities. Regular rhythms have been found in 
a wide array of strategic activities in established firms, ranging from innovation (Turner 
et al., 2013; Ahuja et al., 2013), internationalization (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002), 
acquisition (Laamanen & Keil, 2008), strategic change (Klarner & Raisch, 2013), and top 
management team turnover (Wang & Zatzick, 2019). In this work, the common logic is 
that firms have strong incentives to regulate internal efforts over time in order to attain 
efficiencies. For example, routines theory suggests that firms can reduce coordination 
costs among multiple actors by repetitively performing the same activity according to the 
same time interval (Becker, 2004; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
While these insights are intuitive and powerful, less is known about whether 
rhythms are used in entrepreneurial settings and what boundary conditions are present for 
using them. It has long been recognized that startups tend to be flexible and can respond 
quickly to unanticipated situations (Carter et al., 1994). Startups are generally less 
bureaucratic, structured, and diversified than larger firms, so they are often perceived as 
more agile and responsive to external changes (Ebben & Johnson, 2005; Liao et al., 
2003); they also have fewer formal processes in place and perform fewer planning 
activities (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). As such, in turbulent market conditions, such firms 
may seek to keep up with the environment by adjusting their rate of product introduction 
based on the evolving rate of environmental changes (Bakker & Knoben, 2015; Barry et 
al., 2006; Chen & Nadkarni, 2017). However, scholars have also shown that some 
successful high-tech startups adhere to time-paced, regular rhythms in turbulent 
environments (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). This tension points to a need for greater 
understanding regarding whether startups employ rhythms to organize strategic activities. 
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To explore this puzzle, I focus initially on whether digital startups iterate products with 
regular rhythms, and then consider how this propensity is shaped by their market 
diversification.  
Design iteration rhythms 
A number of strategy scholars have focused on the role of regular rhythms in structuring 
ongoing changes. In this work, researchers treat regular rhythms as a proactive, clock-
based manner of changing (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Gersick, 1994; Turner et al., 
2013). The core theoretical arguments are rooted in organizational routines, which have 
been regarded as the primary means by which organizations accomplish much of what 
they do (Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Nelson and Winter, 1982). As firms employ such 
routines, they produce regularity in the timing of changes, implying that these activities 
will be distributed relatively equally across time. Therefore, if digital startups use regular 
rhythms, the timing of design iteration will be strongly influenced by the passage of clock 
time.  
The behavioral basis underlying the use of regular iteration rhythms centers on the 
need for coordination in design iteration activities (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Turner et 
al., 2010).  As an illustrative quote from my empirical setting, a prominent mobile game 
producer said, “I work with our product managers, quality assurance, and marketing 
every day ... I also work with our engineering and art teams … I release app updates 
every three weeks, so this is a highly cyclical process, but it is a little different each time 
because each new update contains different features, tech, and content” (Taylor, 2019). 
When design iterations are introduced according to consistent time intervals, digital 
startups can increasingly draw on historical precedent to help govern the process of 
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iteration. By timing design iterations to fit this established temporal pattern, the parties 
involved in improving the product are able to focus scarce attention resources (Greve, 
2003; Ocasio, 1997), and utilize efficient means of coordination, e.g., leveraging 
historical precedence and reducing explicit communications (Becker, 2004; Cohen & 
Bacdayan, 1994). Moreover, while this regular, structured way of change decouples 
digital startups from responding to the relentless shifts of external environments, it allows 
for enough adaptation to roughly keep up with the turbulent environment. Thus, the 
concern for coordination incentivizes digital startups to adopt regular iteration rhythms.  
Following prior literature (Turner et al., 2013), I capture the use of regular 
rhythms with temporal fit, which accounts for the alignment of time intervals with prior 
design iteration. For digital startups that use regular design iteration rhythms, the time 
intervals between design iterations should be similar. The likelihood of iteration increases 
when the time since last design iteration is consistent with the time interval for prior 
design iterations.  
Hypothesis 1. Digital startups will be more likely to release their design iterations with 
rhythms. In other words, there is a positive association between the extent of temporal fit 
and design iteration.   
Configuring design iteration rhythms in diverse markets 
As presented in the prior section, my core logic posits that digital startups tend to enact 
design iteration with regular rhythms to diminish the difficulties in internal coordination. 
Next, I theorize how different types of market diversification shape the propensity to use 
regular rhythms. Digital startups can rapidly access multiple markets through digital 
affordances (e.g., iOS app store) with little costs (Shaheer & Li, 2020; Tanriverdi̇ & Lee, 
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2008). It is well recognized that competing in multiple markets simultaneously creates 
interdependencies that result in tremendous coordination costs (Jones & Hill, 1988; Zhou, 
2011). In extending this logic, high market diversification may drive firms to use regular 
design iteration rhythms. Conversely, market diversification may expose startups to 
increasing numbers of external changes and urgent incidents that require responsiveness. 
Thus, I seek to explore how startups configure design iteration rhythms to address the 
challenges associated with market diversification. Specifically, I focus on two different 
types of market diversification—namely platform diversification and international 
diversification—as important factors that shape iteration rhythms. I argue that different 
types of market diversification create distinct challenges for digital startups, and exert 
opposing influences on the use of regular iteration rhythms.  
Platform diversification. Platform diversification has been increasingly adopted 
by digital startups—that is, they develop digital products/services across multiple 
operating system platforms, aiming to reach as many potential users as possible (Corts & 
Lederman, 2009; Tanriverdi̇ & Lee, 2008). Platforms such as iOS and Android are 
technology infrastructures that orchestrate the functioning of ecosystems and set the rules 
for participation by complementor firms (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Moreover, across 
platforms, the technological specifications are quite distinct from one another. For 
example, in the iOS platform directed by Apple, digital startups mostly develop mobile 
apps using SWIFT language, release through the Apple App store, and interact with 




When diversified across different platforms, it is important for digital startups to 
acquire platform-specific knowledge and figure out the interdependencies to compete on 
multiple platforms. In terms of the technological environment, the product designs must 
be tailored to a platform’s core technological functions and interface specifications 
(Cennamo & Santalo, 2019). Yet, it is imperative to keep products mostly consistent 
across platforms, as users expect to have a similar experience across different platforms. 
Moreover, in some cases, the function of firms’ offerings even requires real-time 
consistency in the products/services across platforms (e.g., cross-platform online gaming). 
Thus, digital startups must consider how to feasibly produce the same design iteration in 
multiple platforms. As Mike Blank, the vice president of Origin and EA Access, said, 
“Trying to provide the best experience for players when all of these variables are at play 
is really complex. And so I think over the next two to five years, we’ll learn more about 
how one might be able to bring a game to multiple devices and how you might be able to 
traverse across different kinds of platforms.” 
To compete in multiple platform markets, digital startups are subject to stronger 
pressure to pursue regular design iteration rhythms, as platform diversification can 
increase the burden of internal coordination. Since the cross-platform offerings of 
startups need to remain mostly consistent, the decision to change product designs on one 
platform typically means that it has to be replicated on other platforms, sometimes even 
in real-time. Given the distinct technological environments, development teams within 
digital startups that focus on particular platforms have to engage in ongoing 
communication to understand the factors affecting each other’s decisions and track the 
interrelated decisions that are made (Becker and Murphy, 1992). This reflects the greater 
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effort required to understand and process the content and progress of interrelated 
activities, which translates into more opportunities for errors in decision-making 
(Levinthal, 1997). Thus, I expect the use of regular design iteration rhythms to be more 
pronounced when digital startups have high platform diversification, as the coordination 
burden imposed by such diversification may lead startups to rely more on regular 
rhythms. Put differently, in the presence of high platform diversification, digital startups 
are more likely to iterate with regular rhythms. 
Hypothesis 2. When faced with high platform diversification, digital startups’ use of 
regular design iteration rhythms is strengthened. 
International diversification. While platform diversification strengthens the 
incentives for using regular design iteration rhythms, I argue that digital startups may 
face strong external pressures to be responsive when competing in diverse country 
markets. International diversification is typically manifest in increased geographic 
dispersion of the product market, as firms need to take into account ever-increasing 
numbers of suppliers, customers, and competitors (Hitt et al., 1994; Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). Digital startups using international diversification strategies are exposed to distinct 
institutional environments and social expectations (Chakrabarti et al., 2007; Su & Tsang, 
2015), and they need to meet the expectations of heterogeneous external stakeholders 
from diverse markets. For example, design iteration timing may involve taking into 
account activities like rival actions, consumer demand shifts (e.g., sales holidays), market 
developments (e.g., industry conferences), or evaluations from external capital sources 
(e.g., venture capitalists) in multiple countries. Thus, digital startups are more likely to be 
responsive to external changes when iterating their products.  
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Maintaining regular rhythms and being responsive are less likely to be conflicting 
if the core product is targeting a single country market, where there are fewer important 
stakeholders that digital startups need to pay attention to (Pahnke et al., 2015; Perez-
Nordtvedt et al., 2008). Thus, they are in a better position to comprehend or even foresee 
the moves of stakeholders. Moreover, there may exist dominant rhythms in the market 
that all related stakeholders adhere to (e.g., one-month shutdown of business around the 
Spring Festival in China every year), which are easier to incorporate when developing 
design iteration rhythms. As a result, there is a higher probability for coming up with a 
regular rhythm that balances the need of internal coordination and roughly keeping up 
with changes in the market. Thus, when competing in a single country market, digital 
startups are more likely to maintain a regular design iteration rhythm, because they are in 
a better position to proactively take into consideration the occasional external changes.   
However, when international diversification is high, maintaining regular rhythms 
and being responsive are more likely to be conflicting. Specifically, if their products 
target multiple countries, digital startups may face a more challenging situation where 
external opportunities and urgent incidents are frequent and difficult to predict, given 
limited information processing capability. And it will be difficult to develop a regular 
rhythm that aligns well with the diverse country conditions they face. Thus, to navigate in 
multimarket, fast-changing environments, digital startups have to be responsive and 
flexible with their design iteration timing, which shifts the balance towards being 
responsive in multiple countries at the expense of coordination efficiencies afforded by 
regular rhythms. As an illustration, users from different countries may exhibit varying 
degrees of desire for design iteration in the mobile game context. For example, whereas 
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Korean mobile game users are eager to experience new game designs through updates 
once every two weeks, users in Vietnam are more accustomed to a much slower rate, e.g., 
about once every two months. In this situation, mobile game publishers competing in 
both markets may be less regular in their design iterations given the unique demands in 
each country. Thus, international diversification increases the pressure for being 
responsive, and decreases digital startups’ strategic emphasis on regular design iteration 
rhythms.  
Hypothesis 3. When faced with high international diversification, digital startups’ 
propensity to use regular design iteration rhythms is weakened.  
METHODS 
Empirical context 
To test my hypotheses, I examine design iteration rhythms in the context of the global 
mobile game industry. Mobile gaming (smartphone and tablet) has become a $69 billion 
global business, which took up 45% of the global games market in 2019 (NewZoo, 2019). 
This industry provides a great empirical setting in which to examine design iteration in a 
fast-evolving context. The challenge to stay relevant in the marketplace through frequent 
game updates is well-recognized among mobile game publishers, as is the typical 
resource requirements for investing in updates. Industry experts estimate that about 50-
90% of the resources devoted to product development are spent on the iteration process 
after products are released into the market (Li et al., 2017).  
Specifically, the data foundation is based on the games category on the iOS 
platform. Games are the largest category in the mobile apps industry, both in terms of 
share of the total number of mobile apps (24.9% in iOS) and revenue (e.g., in terms of 
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revenue, seven of the top 10 apps subcategories are part of the games category). Thus, 
games capture a major segment in the mobile apps industry. The update form of design 
iteration is also an important element of competing in game apps, with the update rate of 
top game apps among the highest in the apps industry. To better familiarize ourselves 
with the industry context, I conducted interviews with a number of developers of game 
apps. One described the importance of design iteration in the form of updates as follows, 
“Update is a question of life or death for a mobile game, because users would get bored 
playing the same game within a month. The best way to survive is to update new content 
regularly.”  
Data 
The primary source of the data was acquired from a leading analyst firm in the mobile 
intelligence sector. The firm tracks and archives information related to all mobile apps 
developed for the iOS platform. Its data are extensively used by app developers, venture 
capital firms, and financial analysts.  
Our data set comprises detailed mobile apps information for the period from 
January 1st 2015 to December 31st 2018 across the 58 major iOS country markets that 
were available from the analyst firm. I obtained information on app updates, daily ratings, 
basic app characteristics and developer traits from the analyst firm. While the firm is 
widely viewed as a legitimate source of industry data/information, as a further check on 
the validity of the data, I verified that rankings and ratings of the top 20 apps in the 
acquired data matched corresponding information from two other providers of mobile 
apps data (most mobile app data providers offer free access to select information on 
recent top ranked apps).   
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Following prior literature using mobile apps datasets (Ghose and Han, 2014; 
Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017), I focused on a “top segmentation” approach to collect the 
sample. The distribution of app revenues and downloads is heavily skewed and exhibits a 
long-tail shape. Based on a joint report by Prior Data and Pollen VC (2016), more than 
half (55%) of app store revenue in 2015 was generated by the top 100 apps, with the rest 
taken up by the other 1,500,000 apps. Further, when consumers are browsing apps by 
category, the Apple App Store only shows top apps on its page -- searching by keywords 
is required to reach the rest -- creating a huge difference in market exposure between top 
apps and others (Ghose and Han, 2014). Thus, app publishers that have top ranked apps 
create and capture the major part of value in this sector.  
As opposed to prior research which has used single-country data (Ghose and Han 
2014; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017), the data spanning many countries have enabled us to 
construct an international ranking that comprises the top ranked apps worldwide by 
revenue. To achieve this goal, I adopted a sampling strategy similar to Kapoor and 
Agarwal (2017). I used top grossing game apps that ranked in the top 500 in each month 
from Jan 2015 to Dec 2018 in 58 countries in the iOS game category as the initial pool 
for the sample. Then, due to my focus on digital startups, I tracked the mobile game 
publishers of these apps and kept only those that have released one game, giving us a 
final sample of 110 firms.6 I focus on digital startups which only released one product, 
 
6 To check whether the sample is composed of startups (i.e., de novo) or established firms 
diversifying into the mobile game category (i.e., de alio), I looked closely at a random 
sub-sample of 50 firms in this pool and searched for their firm information in Crunchbase 
database, a widely-used startup-centered data source, and other online resources. All of 
113 
 
because iteration of their core product at the early stages likely matters the most to them. 
In comparison, established firms that have a wide array of products to generate revenues 
do not need to pay particular attention to iteration of all products. The age of these 
startups is on average 3.6 years, with 83% of them lower than 5 years and the eldest 
being 8 years old. As reported later, my analyses also included robustness checks that use 
alternative selection criteria. 
Variables and measurement 
Following prior literature (Turner et al., 2013), I examined the use of regular rhythms in 
terms of the relationship between the temporal fit with the prior design iteration and the 
probability of releasing the next design iteration. Specifically, temporal fit accounts for 
the alignment of time intervals with prior design iteration. For digital startups that use 
regular design iteration rhythms, the time intervals between design iterations should be 
similar. Thus, I expect the likelihood of releasing a design iteration to increase when the 
time since previous design iteration is consistent with the time interval for prior design 
iterations (see Figure 3.1 for visual clarification). 
 Dependent variable. To empirically examine design iteration, this study focused 
on the game update, which is a binary event with values equaling one for the day in 
which the focal mobile game publisher released a new version of its game and zero 
otherwise. To identify design iteration, I leveraged the widely used three-digit naming 
convention (i.e., Version 1.2.0, 3.7.2) for game updates. Typically, an increment in the 
first-digit or the second-digit means visible improvements or changes in interface, 
 
the 50 single-product firms were stand-alone startup firms, rather than established 
companies entering in the mobile game category. 
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features and functionality; and an increment in the third-digit implies bug fixes, which are 
corrective in nature and do not reflect revamped product designs. In other words, an 
increment in the first- or second-digit represents a design iteration, i.e., a substantial 
advance relative to the existing product design. I discussed the concept of design iteration 
with industry experts who specialize in mobile game development, and they confirmed 
that the three-digit naming method is the norm in the mobile game industry. They also 
confirmed that operationalizing mobile game iterations as an increment in the first or 
second digits would provide an appropriate distinction from corrective/minimal product 
adjustments (i.e., bug fixes). In sum, I have a sample of 110 mobile game publishers that 
release first-digit and second-digit games updates in a recurring manner, amounting to 
1,023 game update events during the observation period.   
Explanatory variables. Temporal Misfit7 represents the difference between the 
number of days since the most recent design iteration release and the number of days 
required to release the most recent design iteration. To reflect misfit, I took the absolute 
value of this difference and log-transform it to reflect my expectation of a diminishing 
effect. The temporal misfit measure indicates the extent to which the occurrence of a 
design iteration on a given day, if one were to occur, would be consistent with the 
 
7 In building on prior research, I selected temporal misfit (Turner et al., 2013) as my 
independent variable, rather than time since previous innovation (Turner et al., 2010). 
The two measures are different in that the former captures organization-specific temporal 
patterns, while the latter is based on the idea that there is a typical time interval for 
introducing generational innovations in an industry. Since my argument focuses on the 
existence of routines in specific publishers, I used temporal misfit for my focal results.   
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historical release pattern for the sole product of the firm. This operationalization aligns 
with arguments and empirical work in the rhythms literature (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Turner et al., 2013).  
Platform diversification is operationalized based on a multihoming/cross-platform 
indicator. It equals to 1 when the focal game is listed in both iOS and Android platforms 
and 0 otherwise; a value of 0 indicates that the focal game is only on the iOS platform 
(Ghose & Han, 2014; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Because software development kits are 
different for different platforms, the development of one game on two platforms typically 
requires attaining the same functionality within two distinct development platforms.  
For international diversification, the measure is based on an inverse HHI index 
that captures the geographical dispersion of markets (Cannon & St. John, 2007; Hitt et al., 
1994). For the iOS platform, global market is divided by country boundaries, so that there 
is a separate Apple Store in each country. The inverse HHI index is based on the 
revenues from each country. To calculate the measure, I started at the fine-grained level 
of the firm-country market-day by calculating the revenues. Then, I ranked the country 
market for each app-day by the revenues in a descending way. Next, I calculated Pn,t , 
which is the proportion of the revenues for country n relative to the total revenues for the 
top five countries for the given app on the focal day t. The inverse HHI index is 





2]. The value is close to 1 when the 
digital startup is exposed to multiple countries (markets) and generates equivalent 
revenues from each country, and it is close to 0 when the digital startup focuses on one 
country (or only a few) with corresponding concentration in revenue generation.  
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Control variables. I controlled for a number of covariates that may influence the 
rate of design iteration for a mobile game. I used the number of prior design iterations of 
the game as a proxy for design iteration experience, from the view that such experience 
may affect subsequent design iteration activities (e.g., Turner et al., 2013). I also included 
separate controls for the number of bug fixes (game updates that incur third-digit 
changes), which may affect the likelihood of future design iteration. Pricing strategy 
directly determines the competitors and consumers that an app deals with and thereby 
may influence iteration behavior (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Therefore, I controlled for 
"free strategy" through a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the digital startup 
offers its product for free and 0 otherwise.8 I also controlled for age restriction of product 
offering, which can help to control for the potential influence of targeting heterogeneous 
consumers in that way. Design iteration may also be influenced by the game size and 
product lifecycle. As such, I controlled for game size—the number of bytes of the game 
file (in thousands, log-transformed), and game age, which is the number of days (log 
transformed) since the initial release of its product on the iOS platform. In the sample, I 
expect that game age is likely to correspond closely with firm age. 
At a subcategory level, there may be differences in the competitive intensity for 
iteration across types of games. For example, chess games involve a lower iteration rate 
compared to First-person Shooting (FPS) games. To consider the potential for a 
 
8 Free strategy refers to app pricing models that provide fundamental 
content/functionality for free (Pauwels and Weiss 2008), with revenue originating from 
third-parties (e.g., advertisers) or by charging consumers fees for premium content.   
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confounding influence of subcategory differences, I also included fixed effects for game 
subcategories (16 subcategories in game category).  
To rule out the possibility that design iteration rhythms are driven by competitors 
or complementors (e.g., iOS upgrade rhythm), I included as a control competitors’ 
iterations, measured as the number of first-digit and second-digit updates released by 
other games in the same subcategory in the prior month, and I also controlled for major 
iterations at the platform level as a complementary innovation indicator. Since there is a 
major iOS update in June every year, I observed three new versions for the iOS platform 
between January 2015 and December 2018.  
Analytical approach 
We analyzed the likelihood of a digital startup introducing a design iteration for its 
mobile app game on a given day with parametric event history analysis, which allows 
analysis of the occurrence of an event by incorporating longitudinal data with time-
varying covariates. I updated all time-dependent variables on a daily basis. I selected the 
exponential distribution, which is suitable for modeling data with a constant hazard given 
no prior expectation as to the nature of the distribution (Folta & Miller, 2002; Turner et 
al., 2010). The coefficient results are presented in a hazard format. In the hazard format, a 
positive coefficient reflects an increase in the instantaneous rate of iteration (game 
update). Also, in that design iteration behavior could be correlated within the same digital 
startup, I ran a shared frailty model, which is a random effects model for event history 
analysis. I also used the Cox model and several other alternatives to account for the 
possibility that the distribution of design iteration probability is not constant. These 




Table 3.1 presents summary statistics and the correlations between covariates. Table 3.2 
presents the results examining all the hypotheses in Model 1-6. The interpretation of 
interaction effects in nonlinear models is complex because the effect depends on the 
value of both interacting variables and other variables (Ai & Norton, 2003; Hoetker, 
2007). To overcome such interpretation challenges for event history analysis, I employed 
two sets of approaches to interpret the results. First, in the main results, I interpret 
coefficients in terms of multiplicative effects, which have been recognized as an intuitive 
and natural interpretation approach for event history analysis (Buis, 2010; Geng et al., 
2016).9 Second, given that the multiplicative effect does not gauge the linear change in 
 
9 There are well-known marginal effects interpretation challenges associated with non-
linear models (Bowen and Wiersema, 2004). Marginal effects are interpreted as the 
change in predicted dependent variable when the independent variable increases by one 
unit – d(y)/d(x). An implication of this nonlinearity for hypothesis testing is that the value 
of an estimated coefficient does not equal the true size of marginal effect, as the value of 
d(y)/d(x) is not constant across all x values. To precisely describe the varying effects for 
event history models, a multiplicative approach is recommended (Buis, 2010; Geng et al., 
2016) because multiplicative effects do not vary with the baseline hazard rate and other 
variables due to the exponential formula. With the multiplicative approach – d(lny)/d(x), 
the adapted marginal effects are constant and easier to interpret. The adapted marginal 
effects indicate the ratio by which the dependent variable changes for a unit change in an 
explanatory variable, i.e., how does the hazard rate change as a percentage of the baseline 
value when there is one-unit change in the focal explanatory variable.   
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the probability of iteration release, I also show the change in the hazard rate holding all 
covariates at mean levels (with the dummy variable Free held at 0) using recommended 
graphical analysis (Hoetker, 2007). I also conducted simple slope tests, as suggested by 
Aiken and West (1991), to more clearly understand the interaction results. Specifically, I 
examined the statistical significance, and interpreted the practical significance of the 
effect of temporal misfit at different levels of moderators using STATA margins and 
marginsplot commands (Cleves et al., 2016).  
Model 1 is the baseline model with control variables. This model indicates that 
the rate of design iteration increases with platform diversification, game size, 
competitors’ moves, and decreases with prior number of design iterations, prior bug fixes, 
and age. Model 2 includes the effect of temporal misfit. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the 
results indicate a significant negative effect, such that as temporal misfit increases, the 
likelihood of iteration decreases (coefficient= -0.384, p<0.001). Based on the results from 
Model 2, a 10.0% increase in temporal misfit is associated with a 3.6% decrease in the 
predicted probability of design iteration.10 Alternatively, to capture linear change in 
 
10 The standard interpretation of a coefficient β in a regression analysis is that a one-unit 
change in the independent variable results in β change in the expected value of the 
dependent variable. In other words, when independent variable changes from a to b, the 
dependent variable would change from x to y accordingly, where β = (y-x)/(b-a). Given 
that both independent and dependent variables are log transformed in my study (our 
independent variable is log transformed temporal misfit and survival analysis reports 
log(hazard rate of update)), a one-unit change in log(temporal misfit) results in β change 
in log(hazard rate of update). To interpret how change in temporal misfit (e.g., temporal 
120 
 
design iteration probability, the results indicate that, holding all variables at mean levels, 
when temporal misfit increases from its mean level to one standard deviation above the 
mean, the hazard rate of iteration decreases by 42.7% (from 0.0089 to 0.0051). 
Models 3 and 5 addressed Hypothesis 2, which predicts that temporal misfit will 
have a greater (i.e., more negative) effect on the rate of iteration when platform 
diversification is high. I tested this hypothesis by including interaction terms between 
platform diversification and temporal misfit. The result indicates a negative and 
significant coefficient (p<0.01 in Model 3 and p<0.001 in Model 5) for the interaction 
term, supporting Hypothesis 2. Further support for Hypothesis 2 is provided by simple 
slope tests using Model 3. The results show that the effect of temporal misfit is 
statistically significant when platform diversification is low or high. A 10.0% increase in 
temporal misfit is associated with a 2.5% decrease in the predicted probability of iteration 
(p<0.001) when the digital startup only competes on one platform market, and a 3.9% 
decrease in the predicted probability of iteration (p<0.001) when the digital startup 
competes on both iOS and Android platform markets. 
Models 4 and 5 examined Hypothesis 3. It predicts that as international 
diversification increases, the relationship between temporal misfit and the likelihood of 
iteration release weakens (i.e., becomes less negative). As expected, the positive and 
 
misfit changes from a to b) leads to change in hazard rate of update (e.g., hazard rate 
changes from x to y), the equation should be β = [log(y)-log(x)]/ [log(b)-(a)]. It can be 
simplified as y/x =(b/a)β. To interpret the coefficient, I make b/a = 1.1 or 110%, 
indicating a 10% increase in the number of days of temporal misfit from a to b would 
change the predicted probability of update by (1.1β-1)*100%, from x to y. 
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significant coefficient (p<0.001 in Models 4 and 5) for the interaction term indicates less 
use of regular rhythms for digital startups competing under more diverse markets. A 
10.0% increase in temporal misfit is associated with a 4.4% decrease in the predicted 
probability of iteration (p<0.001) when international diversification is low, a 3.6% 
decrease in the predicted probability of iteration (p<0.001) when international 
diversification is at the mean level, and a 2.8% decrease in the predicted probability of 
iteration (p<0.001) when international diversification is high. 
To aid the interpretation of the moderation effects from non-linear models, 
Hoetker (2007) recommends the use of graphical analysis of marginal effects for values 
of the independent and moderator variables. By presenting a series of plots of predicted 
probabilities with high/low level of moderators, I manage to capture the change in 
iteration release probability across important contingencies. As Figure 3.2 shows per 
Hypothesis 2, when the startup firms’ game is diversified across two platforms (iOS and 
Android), i.e., high platform diversification, there is a sharper negative effect associated 
with increasing temporal misfit. In contrast, the curve exhibits a flatter negative 
association if involving only one platform. Figure 3.3 provides further support for 
Hypothesis 3. The likelihood of iteration drops more sharply as temporal misfit increases 
for low international diversification. In comparison, the curve is flatter when international 
diversification is high. 
Robustness tests 
We employed several sets of sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of my results. 
First, as a granular examination, I conducted two tests, each focusing on one type of 
design iteration. In constructing the current dependent variable, I included both first-digit 
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and second-digit updates as design iterations. Given that the number of second-digit 
updates is about 4.9 times more than the number of first-digit updates, I sought to explore 
whether my results that digital startups use rhythms to arrange design iterations are 
mostly driven by the second-digit updates. Thus, I reconstructed two separate datasets, 
each focusing on one type of design iteration. I found that all hypotheses are supported 
even if I look at the first-digit and second-digit updates separately, indicating the 
existence of rhythms in both 1-digit and 2-digit design iteration activity. In addition, I 
conducted several tests with the full sample and main model to further mitigate the 
concern that prior first-digit and second-digit updates play different roles in setting up 
rhythms. Specifically, I added into the main analyses three control variables, with one 
indicating whether the type of the most recent design iteration is first-digit/second-digit, 
and another two indicating the time since the most recent first-digit update and the time 
since the most recent second-digit update. All of my hypotheses remain supported.  
Second, I examined alternative operationalizations of temporal misfit. In my focal 
analyses, I operationalized temporal misfit by taking the log transformed difference 
between the number of days since the most recent iteration release and the number of 
days required to release the most recent iteration for the focal product, assuming 
symmetric effects across early and late sides of temporal misfit. As one robustness check, 
I allowed for asymmetric effects between the early side (when the number of days since 
most recent iteration release is smaller than the number of days required to release the 
most recent iteration) and the late side (when the number of days since most recent 
iteration release is larger than the number of days required to release the most recent 
iteration) of temporal misfit by rerunning the same model using subsamples. In the early 
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side, all of my hypotheses are strongly supported, while in the late side, the main effect is 
still supported but the results for both moderating effects do not reach conventional levels 
of statistical significance. I speculate that the lack of support for moderating effects on 
the late side could result from different managerial mentalities when being early and 
being late. When being early, publishers may still have the latitude to adjust mobile 
update timing depending on different conditions. Yet, when being late, publishers may be 
focused on iterating as fast as possible, rather than considering other contingencies like 
the market diversification conditions.  
Third, since the release of design iterations for the same digital startup may be 
correlated, I used a shared frailty model, also known as the random-effect model for 
event history analysis, to account for such correlation. The results remain consistent after 
using the shared frailty model. 
Fourth, I adjusted the sample and analysis technique to mitigate the concern that 
the risk of releasing design iteration is close to zero right after the release of the prior 
iteration. Specifically, I dropped the 10% observations for each episode of design 
iteration that are closest to the release of the prior design iteration. All of my hypotheses 
are still significantly supported. I also used the Cox model, which does not assume a 
constant hazard of design iteration over time. The findings with the Cox model are 
consistent with my main results.  
DISCUSSION 
Design iterations are of critical importance for digital startups to compete in today’s 
business landscape. Practitioner insights on design iteration approaches have suggested 
that digital startups maneuver design iterations through regular rhythms, which exhibit 
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consistent time intervals between design iterations. Yet, this emphasis on regular rhythms 
runs counter to the received wisdom of being responsive, particularly in the digital sector. 
Given this tension, I sought to investigate whether digital startups use regular rhythms for 
iteration, and if so, what factors condition the use of regular rhythms. I argue that digital 
startups have coordination-based incentives for regular rhythms, and found evidence that 
digital startups do tend to iterate with regular rhythms. Moreover, I theorize that different 
types of market diversification expose digital startups to distinct challenges, and exert 
opposing influences on design iteration rhythms. In turn, I found that the enactment of 
regular design iteration rhythms is more pronounced if digital startups compete across 
multiple platform markets and is less pronounced if they compete in multiple country 
markets. My ideas and findings provide the basis for several important literature 
contributions. 
First, I contribute to understanding of design iteration rhythms as a critical 
innovation strategy. Design iteration aims to meet a specific market need by repetitively 
testing and adjusting product designs (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). It is often seen by 
technology scholars as an effort of product refinement before releasing on the market 
(e.g., Thomke and Bell, 2001), which mostly assumes an enduring need and stable market 
conditions. Yet, the increasingly turbulent business environment suggests design iteration 
may have new significance. If design iteration in stable environments acts like hitting a 
fixed target, in changing environments, it seeks to keep up with a moving target. Iteration 
enables firms to keep up with market changes (e.g., evolving user needs, regulatory 
changes) by altering product designs and learning from market feedback. Without design 
iteration, firms risk innovating for a market which may be short-lived or even no longer 
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exists (Iansiti and MacCormack, 1997; MacCormack et al., 2001). Thus, there has been a 
burst of use of design iteration among practitioners. However, I know little about how 
firms organize iteration. 
We argue that rhythms are of particular importance for managing design iteration. 
On the one hand, design iteration rhythms directly determine whether digital startups can 
continuously sense and capture the flow of opportunities. For example, if consumer tastes 
change every three months, then iterating with the same rhythm may help digital startups 
quickly learn about the new demand and adjust their product offerings accordingly. On 
the other hand, rhythms shape the cost structure of design iteration activities. A regular 
rhythm has been argued to have lower costs for cross-function coordination and 
absorbing new information, which are vital for digital startups to efficiently perform 
design iteration. Thus, I highlight the role of design iteration rhythms to keep firms 
innovative, particularly in a turbulent business environment. 
Second, my work contributes to strategic rhythms research by reconciling the 
tension between using regular rhythms and being responsive. Extant rhythms literature 
has mostly agreed that firms pursue regular rhythms to enhance internal organization 
(Ahuja et al., 2013; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Turner et al., 
2013; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). Firms using regular rhythms appear to prioritize 
internal focus and decouple from the external environment. However, an underlying 
motivation to develop strategic rhythms is so firms can keep up with the external 
environment (Perez-Nordtvedt et al., 2008). Therefore, I also investigate how the use of 
regular rhythms may be shaped by market conditions. 
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To do so, I examine how digital startups configure design iteration rhythms to 
compete in diverse markets. Competing simultaneously in diverse markets has been 
recognized as a critical and pervasive challenge for digital startups (Chen et al., 2018; 
Shaheer and Li, 2020). If they focus exclusively on regular design iteration rhythms, their 
design iteration timing will not take into account factors tied to market diversification. 
The results show that different types of market diversification exhibit opposing 
influences on iteration rhythms, with platform diversification facilitating the use of 
design iteration rhythms while international diversification inhibits it. I argue that 
emphasis on regular rhythms versus being responsive depends on the degree to which 
firms prioritize internal coordination versus external pressure. Specifically, platform 
diversification can generate a considerable coordination burden in development processes, 
enhancing the need for regular rhythms. In contrast, when international diversification 
adds to external pressure to respond to heterogenous needs, firms have great incentive to 
take care of urgent incidents; thus, firms may compromise coordination benefits in order 
to keep up with the environment. Digital startups configure their rhythms in different 
directions to deal with the distinctive challenges of market diversification. Therefore, 
enacting design iteration timing can involve tradeoffs between coordination and 
responding to external changes. 
Our work on design iteration rhythms also has important implications for 
understanding organizations’ dynamic capabilities. Specifically, my investigation 
uncovers routinized, organized patterns in design iteration. The adoption of routines may 
manifest themselves as higher order capabilities, like dynamic capabilities (Helfat & 
Winter, 2011), which are widely regarded as vital factors that help businesses initiate and 
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manage changes. Moreover, my work can contribute to an important debate surrounding 
the dynamic capabilities perspective, as to whether capabilities and processes tend to be 
similar or heterogenous across firms (Barreto, 2010). In contrast to the view that dynamic 
capabilities are heterogenous across firms (Teece et al., 1997), my findings are more 
consistent with the “best practice” view (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), which suggests that 
there is a commonly accepted way to “hit a golf ball” with some idiosyncrasies.  
Third, my study sheds light on how firms compete on the edge of chaos. The 
initial case studies by Brown and Eisenhardt (1997, 1998) propose that firms competing 
on the edge may employ strategies like regular rhythms of change to structure the chaos 
and randomness. When the turbulence and complexity of external environments go 
beyond managers’ bounded rationality, Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) theorize that 
managers rely on temporal heuristics like rhythms, which can be acquired and updated in 
a learning by doing approach. To date, little has been done along this intriguing line, to 
investigate whether firms can still accomplish regular rhythms or be pushed off the edge 
when confronted by a more uncontrollable, incomprehensible environment. I are among 
the first to empirically scrutinize this proposition. Grounded in a turbulent environment, 
the digital economy, my results indicate that digital startups enact regular rhythms. 
Further, I investigate how digital startups modify regular rhythms when competing in 
diverse markets. I find that the diversification of digital startups may either reinforce or 
weaken the use of regular design iteration rhythms. Specifically, they strongly adhere to 
regular rhythms when competing across interdependent (platform) markets and 
frequently break out regular rhythms when competing across heterogeneous (country) 
markets. Thus, this study contributes to extant understanding of how firms compete on 
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the edge of chaos by arguing and finding that firms’ use of regular rhythms is contingent 
upon the market conditions they are faced with. 
In addition, my study also contributes to our understanding about the digital 
entrepreneurship phenomenon. Despite the economic significance of digital startups, the 
related literature is still nascent, with only a few conceptual papers clarifying their digital 
underpinnings (Eden, 2018).  It is known that given their modular digital architecture, 
digital startups can be very flexible to rapidly shift across a wide range of possible 
configurations of product designs (Yoo et al., 2012; McKinley et al., 2013). Moreover, 
digital startups are able to quickly access diverse markets through digital affordances, 
which allows for early and rapid international growth (Chen et al., 2019) and platform 
diversification (Tanriverdi̇ and Lee, 2008). I dive into the entanglement between these 
two characteristics of digital startups. In addition, given the lack of theoretical 
development on this phenomenon, I bring strategy-by-doing (Eisenhardt and Bingham, 
2017; Ott et al., 2017) into it. I see a valuable opportunity to bridge these two largely 
separate literatures to date and demonstrate how such a bridge can advance both 
literatures in significant ways.  
CONCLUSION 
This study contributes to our understanding of design iteration rhythms as an important 
strategy to manage innovation, particularly in the digital sector. I argue that digital 
startups prefer to iterate with regular rhythms rather than being responsive. Further, this 
study proposes a novel argument that the use of regular design iteration rhythms can be 
either facilitated or hindered when competing in diverse markets, depending on the type 
of market diversification. I reconcile the tension between using regular rhythms and 
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being responsive by showing that the enactment of design iteration timing is a balancing 




Table 3.1 Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
 
  Mean S.D. Min Max 
1 Design iteration 0.012 0.111 0.000 1.000 
2 Temporal misfit 4.057 1.460 0.000 7.416 
3 Platform diversification 0.769 0.421 0.000 1.000 
4 International diversification 0.453 0.318 0.000 1.000 
5 Prior iteration 8.628 6.964 1.000 38.000 
6 Prior bug fixes 8.229 9.184 0.000 41.000 
7 Free game 0.947 0.224 0.000 1.000 
8 
Age restriction of game 
content 
10.953 3.937 4.000 17.000 
9 Game size 0.382 0.592 0.026 3.190 
10 Game age restriction 6.332 0.923 0.000 7.975 
11 Competitor 4.760 0.457 2.398 5.677 
12 Complementor 0.081 0.273 0.000 1.000 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Design iteration 1.000      
2 Temporal misfit -0.078 1.000     




-0.001 0.007 0.233 1.000   
5 Prior iteration 0.026 -0.193 0.128 0.180 1.000  
6 Prior bug fixes -0.028 0.191 0.132 -0.055 0.077 1.000 
7 Free game 0.005 0.011 -0.039 -0.123 -0.041 0.059 
8 
Age restriction of game 
content 
0.005 -0.067 0.036 -0.012 0.084 -0.212 
9 Game size 0.001 0.018 -0.119 -0.032 0.105 0.026 
10 Game age restriction -0.044 0.414 0.206 0.149 0.371 0.300 
11 Competitor 0.016 -0.046 -0.168 -0.075 0.184 0.179 
12 Complementor 0.005 0.015 0.006 0.014 0.031 0.027 
  7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Design iteration       
2 Temporal misfit       




      




6 Prior bug fixes       
7 Free game 1.000      
8 
Age restriction of game 
content 
0.287 1.000     
9 Game size 0.092 0.048 1.000    
10 Game age restriction -0.054 -0.063 0.092 1.000   
11 Competitor 0.109 0.065 0.127 0.043 1.000  
12 Complementor -0.004 -0.003 0.003 0.029 0.047 1.000 
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Table 3.2 Estimates for Temporal Misfit and Design Iteration 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent variable      
      
Temporal misfit  -0.384 -0.267 -0.509 -0.370 
  (0.026) (0.052) (0.043) (0.056) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
      
Interaction terms      
Temporal misfit × Platform 
diversification 
  -0.151  -0.234 
   (0.058)  (0.060) 
   [0.009]  [0.000] 
      
Temporal misfit × International 
diversification 
   0.277 0.374 
    (0.076) (0.080) 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
      
Controls      
Platform diversification 0.336 0.104 0.558 0.136 0.846 
 (0.086) (0.091) (0.200) (0.092) (0.207) 
 [0.000] [0.255] [0.005] [0.138] [0.000] 
      
International diversification 0.069 -0.079 -0.103 -0.948 -1.293 
 (0.114) (0.125) (0.125) (0.271) (0.285) 
 [0.547] [0.528] [0.410] [0.000] [0.000] 
      
Prior iterations -0.029 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
      
Prior bug fixes -0.028 -0.026 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
      
Free -0.038 0.177 0.187 0.197 0.216 
 (0.204) (0.206) (0.205) (0.206) (0.204) 
 [0.850] [0.390] [0.363] [0.339] [0.290] 
      
Age restriction of game content 0.022 -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 [0.080] [0.355] [0.277] [0.283] [0.179] 
      
Game size 0.116 0.045 0.054 0.020 0.030 
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 (0.063) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
 [0.066] [0.511] [0.437] [0.766] [0.668] 
      
Game age restriction -0.242 -0.191 -0.190 -0.192 -0.192 
 (0.029) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
      
Competitor 0.965 0.757 0.739 0.774 0.746 
 (0.147) (0.157) (0.157) (0.158) (0.158) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
      
Complementor 0.102 0.170 0.176 0.165 0.172 
 (0.112) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) 
 [0.362] [0.138] [0.126] [0.151] [0.134] 
      
Constant -7.932 -5.655 -5.904 -5.340 -5.583 
 (0.753) (0.827) (0.832) (0.832) (0.834) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
      
Subcategory FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 73291 73291 73291 73291 73291 
Log likelihood -622.2 -591.1 -589.0 -589.1 -581.8 
Notes.  Standard errors are included in parentheses. P-values are in square brackets. All 
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